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Few would dispute that ASEAN has emerged as the most successful case of regionalism outside Europe. When it was formed on 8 August 1967, however, its future appeared uncertain against a backdrop of regional conflict and confrontation. Communism and, in particular, the threat posed by a united Vietnam after 1975, was an external challenge which galvanized ASEAN and strengthened its cohesion. Singapore's minister of Information and Arts, George Yeo, once declared that "without the Vietnamese threat, it is doubtful that ASEAN would have become the regional grouping it is today."⁽¹⁾ The organization developed characteristics that were associated with successful regionalism including, above all, a consensus decision-making mechanism which in the most critical issues gave priority to the collective interest over the individual interests of members. The maintenance of the collective interest in the face of the external challenge of communism was a major success for ASEAN which strengthened its diplomatic cohesion accordingly.⁽²⁾ Today ASEAN faces new challenges that will test its cohesion in other ways, and which will demand changes in the way Southeast Asian regionalism has been habitually viewed.

In theoretical terms the pressures that ASEAN faces today could be depicted as a clash between the old and new regionalism. Old regionalism has been characterized as a product of the cold war, as inward-looking, exclusive and created by governments for specific security or economic purposes. New regionalism, in contrast, is outward-looking, nonexclusive and multidimensional in function. In the new regionalism, transnational and overlapping linkages are established with other organizations or groups of states which endow it with a complex and multilevel character. The new regionalism is the product of the demands of state as well as nonstate actors, such as business groups and NGOs, whose needs have expanded well beyond the constraints of the sovereign state. The new regionalism is a recognition of the inadequacy not only of the sovereign state but of past efforts at regionalism which have been limited in nature and function, incapable of satisfying the enhanced political and economic demands of the post-cold war era.⁽³⁾

ASEAN was conceived in the cold war as a political and diplomatic body that publicly espoused an economic purpose. As an institution ASEAN acted as a diplomatic vehicle for the coordination of regional positions in relation to Communist subversion and the Cambodian conflict in particular. Its attempts to develop economic functions over the period 1977-92 were premature and singularly disappointing bearing testimony to its particular cold war role.⁽⁴⁾ In this respect ASEAN's origins, exclusive membership and diplomatic cold war function justified its characterization as old regionalism in a Southeast Asian context. The end of the cold war, however, stimulated new expectations of regionalism and called for an extension of its functions into areas other than the diplomatic field. As the Southeast Asian countries searched for a suitable regional vehicle for their enhanced expectations, ASEAN faced considerable pressure for a restructuring of the organization to accommodate new demands. These demands included additional and more extensive economic and business functions, as well as a broadening of its activities beyond a limited government circle to include business groups

and civil society. In this respect ASEAN confronts the challenge to adapt to new regionalism which accounts for the current organizational tensions and difficulties.

The challenge arises as a result of several developments, the first being the organization's expansion. ASEAN was, at the outset, a subregional organization that represented the non-Communist part of Southeast Asia.(5) The vision of a united region propagated by Indonesian leaders as well as security considerations dictated the organization's expansion to include Indochina and Myanmar.(6) With expansion, however, comes the inevitable dilution of the organization's cohesion and attendant difficulties in forming an operative consensus over critical issues. Secondly, new functions were added to ASEAN which was adjusted to accommodate the economic needs of its members in the expectation that economics would provide a firm foundation for Southeast Asian regionalism. Economics knows no regional loyalties and could undermine this intention as ASEAN members develop relations that go beyond the confines of their regional identity. Thirdly, to manage their external security environment ASEAN members have supported the formation of an Asia-Pacific common security dialogue which would engage the major powers. This poses yet another challenge to ASEAN as this security dialogue confronts the organization with the spectre of redundancy. Each of these developments has created particular problems for ASEAN regionalism that will be examined in turn.

ASEAN's EXPANSION

The various factors in ASEAN's expansion include, above all, the desire to create a Southeast Asian community, which has been a notably Indonesian vision. As a regional organization, ASEAN would not be complete without embracing all the states of Southeast Asia, which has been defined to include Indochina and Myanmar but not Papua New Guinea.(7) There is also the strategic factor behind ASEAN's expansion in terms of a desire to establish a united Southeast Asian community that would prevent great power penetration of the region. Indonesian leaders have regarded an expanded regional organization as a shield against China, though other ASEAN members have not necessarily shared this view. Lastly, the economic factor is important as a widely shared reason for the expansion of the organization. As Indonesia's coordinating Minister for Production and Distribution Hartarto explained, an expanded ASEAN represents a market of 500 million people, one of the largest markets in the world and an unparalleled opportunity for local manufacturers.(8)

The specific problems that arise from ASEAN's expansion from a tightly knit community of six states to a broader grouping of ten states can be well understood, however. An ASEAN consensus can no longer be expected over all issues as members include states of widely different historical experiences and foreign policy orientations. Moreover, the organization will include new conflicts and disputes of the kind that have been largely defused amongst the original members of the organization. Most significant for ASEAN would be those disputes that involve external powers, China above all, in which case organizational expansion could result in new tensions with a major neighbouring power. There is also the problem of including within ASEAN regimes with dubious human rights records, which aggravates relations with ASEAN's Western partners and provokes international criticism.

Vietnam's membership in ASEAN was formalized at the 28th Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM) held in Brunei in July 1995. As Indonesia's Foreign Minister Ali Alatas remarked, this event brought ASEAN closer to the goal of a regional association covering all Southeast Asia.(9) ASEAN members severely castigated Vietnam as an aggressive and expansionist power during the Cambodian conflict. Their rapid reconciliation with this country after the termination of this conflict bears testimony to the strength of the regional vision. For Vietnam, membership in ASEAN was seen as a means to buttress its position in relation to China, and a possible constraint upon Beijing's behaviour in relation to the existing territorial disputes.(10) Moreover, ASEAN promised to act as an economic stimulus for a previously isolated state that

had stagnated under Communist rule. As Premier Vo Van Kiet declared, Vietnam had to narrow the gap with her neighbours by the year 2000 which was, as he explained, a matter of life and death.(11) Through membership in ASEAN, Vietnam also hoped to gain entry into APEC ahead of a queue of interested states and to obtain the benefits of collective bargaining over economic issues with major economic powers.

Within ASEAN circles the prevailing view is that regional security would be enhanced by Vietnam's inclusion in ASEAN, and that the situation would be more precarious if it were excluded. Accordingly, tensions in Vietnam's relationship with China would be constrained by ASEAN which may otherwise break out into open conflict to the detriment of the region. The 1,300-km land border with China has been a source of conflict as the Vietnamese have accused China of occupying small areas of Vietnamese soil since the 1979 border conflict. Nonetheless, tensions have been defused as part of a general improvement in relations with China which began once the Cambodian conflict was settled. Vietnamese party leader Do Muoi visited Beijing from 26 November-2 December 1995 when both sides agreed that border claims should not hinder the development of relations.(12) An agreement on the restoration of rail links which had been suspended since 1979 also resulted from the visit.

Of greater concern to ASEAN is Vietnam's dispute with China over the South China Sea. China may be willing to negotiate the land border with Vietnam and, indeed, at the fifth round of border negotiations in May 1995, it was decided to conduct an aerial survey. The South China Sea is another matter, however, and here China has refused to negotiate. Vietnamese naval vessels have already clashed with Chinese craft near Chigua Reef on 14 March 1988 as China began placing troops on some of the Spratly Islands, eventually occupying nine.(13) Recurrent tensions have been reported as both Vietnam and China have attempted to exploit the oil and gas resources of their overlapping claims. On 8 May 1992 China awarded an exploration contract to the American company Crestone whose director Randall Thompson claimed that China had offered naval protection for the company's exploration activities.(14) The area granted by China to Crestone was adjacent to the blocks that Vietnam had earmarked for similar exploration by foreign companies. Vietnam complained that Chinese vessels began test drilling for oil in their sea zone from September to November 1992, and again in September 1993. Several incidents were recorded when on 19 April 1994 Crestone announced that it would begin drilling in its allotted area; in the same month, five Vietnamese vessels gave chase to a Chinese survey ship in the area while in July 1994 two Chinese vessels blocked a Vietnamese oil rig.(15) On 10 April 1996, Vietnam granted two blocks to an American company, Conoco, whose exploration zone overlaps with that given by the Chinese to Crestone.(16) Unless some mechanism to reconcile the competing claims is negotiated, the likelihood of further clashes between China and Vietnam cannot be excluded.

Vietnam's dispute with China over competing claims in the South China Sea has now become an ASEAN problem. There was a period in ASEAN's history when the organization's ethos demanded that members support each other, not necessarily by military means but diplomatically and politically, in order to preserve a united front. That unity of diplomatic position was hailed as ASEAN's great achievement during the Cambodian conflict when members supported Thailand's position, sometimes with considerable misgivings, in relation to the Vietnamese occupation of 1978-89. That same unity of purpose cannot be replicated over the South China Sea as the ASEAN countries have staked much on the development of economic and business ties with China. Indeed, China has been regarded as a "benevolent stimulus" for the ASEAN economies and an opportunity rather than a competitor.(17) Moreover, the ASEAN countries would be careful to avoid any provocative action that China could perceive as part of a new policy of containment involving external powers. ASEAN countries would be highly unlikely to jeopardize those ties with China for the sake of organizational solidarity with Vietnam. Should conflict erupt between China and Vietnam in the South China Sea, the Vietnamese could not anticipate support from the other ASEAN members. In this situation ASEAN would be compelled to redefine itself as a loose

organization in which members could not expect organizational support in all circumstances.

Cambodia and Laos are expected to join ASEAN in 1997. Laos attained observer status with the organization during the 25th AMM, Annual Ministerial Meeting, held in Manila in July 1992. Deputy Foreign Minister Phongsavath Boupoupha explained that Laos was not ready for membership in ASEAN in view of the financial obligations (an initial payment of \$1 million to the ASEAN Secretariat was required followed by annual payments of \$750,000) and the need for English-speaking officials to attend the 250 annual meetings held under the ASEAN aegis.⁽¹⁸⁾ Nonetheless, in a letter to the secretariat dated 15 March 1996, Laos expressed its formal intention to join the organization in 1997. Laos does not represent a major problem for ASEAN where the main concerns relate to Cambodia which was granted observer status within the organization during the 28th AMM, held in Bandar Seri Begawan in July 1995. In a letter to the ASEAN Secretariat dated 23 March 1996, the Cambodian foreign minister, Ung Huot, declared that his country would also join the organization in 1997.

The problems that Cambodia would bring into the organization are two-fold. First is the complicated issue of Cambodia's political stability, which was left unsettled by the U.N.-sponsored elections of 23-28 May 1993 and the UN Transitional Administration (UNTAD) over 1991-93. The numbers of Khmer Rouge who refused to participate in the 1993 elections have declined considerably since the days when they posed a credible threat to the country in the 1980s. With the loss of Chinese and Thai support, the movement has suffered from poor morale and factional conflicts have erupted between the hard-liners and the pragmatists who wanted to cooperate with the peace process.⁽¹⁹⁾ Mass defections have been reported since 1993 as the movement slowly disintegrated but none were so spectacular as Ieng Sary's defection to the Phnom Penh government, together with two divisional commanders, announced on 8 August 1996.⁽²⁰⁾ The disintegration of the Khmer Rouge movement removes a threat to the government but exacerbates existing problems of banditry, crime and chaos. During the 28th AMM, Ung Huot declared that Cambodia would no longer be a problem for ASEAN and would not appear on the ASEAN agenda.⁽²¹⁾ This was an excessively optimistic evaluation as Cambodian political stability and the absence of an effective central government in that country will continue to trouble ASEAN for some time to come.

Most disturbing for ASEAN is the issue of Cambodia's territorial dispute with Vietnam which is linked with the status of the Vietnamese minority in Cambodia. When in power through 1975-78, the Khmer Rouge gave vent to Cambodian hostility towards the Vietnamese in their extermination drives and launched numerous attacks upon Vietnamese villages along the common border. These attacks embroiled Vietnam in a full scale border war which subsequently led to the invasion of 25 December 1978. A joint border commission was established during Vo Van Kiet's visit to Phnom Penh in April 1994 when the Cambodian side complained that the Vietnamese had occupied Cambodian border territory since the 1960s.⁽²²⁾ First Prime Minister Prince Ranariddh accused the Vietnamese of occupying 200-400 metres of land in Svay Rieng province and declared that Cambodia would seek ASEAN assistance.⁽²³⁾ The problem of the ill-defined border was negotiated by the Joint Border Commission which met 20-23 May 1996 in Ho Chi Minh City. Ranariddh at that stage described the Vietnamese presence as an invasion.⁽²⁴⁾

In the absence of legitimate centralized authority, the ugly prospect arises that the local Vietnamese minority may be targeted as part of a nationalist-inspired campaign to gain political support. Another bout of Vietnamese bashing, which according to reports would be popular, could intensify the border problem with Vietnam and would present ASEAN with an escalating dispute. The Vietnamese were specifically targeted on a number of occasions over 1993-94 by the Khmer Rouge during their attempts to arouse local support. The Cambodian National Assembly passed an emigration law on 22 September 1994, signed by King Sihanouk, which made provision for the expulsion of foreigners. Vietnam protested to the U.N., asking for protection for the estimated 200,000-500,000 Vietnamese that resided in

Cambodia.(25) The emigration law, however, could not become effective without passage of the nationality law which was subject to further negotiation. By early 1996, Article 2 of this bill had been drafted to equate citizenship with Khmer ethnicity and to describe the Vietnamese and Chinese as foreign residents.(26) The Nationality Act was passed in August 1996 to allow the holding of local and general elections, in 1997 and 1998 respectively. According to reports, Sihanouk had assured all minorities of the right to remain in the country if they could prove that they were resident in Cambodia before the Lon Nol coup of 18 March 1970.(27) What would be the fate of those who could not provide such documentary evidence or who had entered the country after 1970 is indeed a pertinent question.

Perhaps the most troublesome problem is Myanmar's gradual admission into ASEAN. Postcolonial Burma under Ne Win's rule had no interest in regionalism and pursued a policy of neutrality that could be described as appeasement of China. When the military assumed direct control through the State Law and Order Council (SLORC) after the coup of 18 September 1988, Myanmar, as it was then renamed, became excessively dependent upon China for weapons and trade. Under the agreement of 6 August 1988, the land border was opened for direct trade with China, allowing Chinese traders to flock into the country and to dominate the country's external trade relations.(28) SLORC delegations visited Beijing in October 1989 and again in August 1991 to negotiate weapons deals to a total of \$1 billion which included six Hainan class patrol vessels, twelve F-7 and twelve F-6 fighter aircraft, sixty T-63 tanks and other smaller naval craft, ground-based radar, anti-aircraft cannons, APCs, small arms and ammunition. In addition, Myanmar naval officers and pilots were sent to China for training while Chinese technicians were despatched to Myanmar in turn.(29)

With Chinese weapons, SLORC will be able to increase the size of the infantry by a reported seventy battalions, which will strengthen its capability to suppress dissent and to control rebellious minorities.(30) Moreover, it seemed that China's next step would be to establish a naval presence in Myanmar which would allow it to project naval power into the Indian Ocean. China reportedly expressed interest in a position at Bassein in the Irrawaddy delta, and had apparently obtained access to a listening post with signal antenna in the Cocos Islands. The Chinese had also pressed SLORC for similar access to Ramree Island and Victoria Point.(31) During his visit to Yangon in December 1994, Chinese Premier Li Peng felt it necessary to deny any interest in a naval presence in the Indian Ocean.(32) Nonetheless, that interest may be stimulated by the development of the Chinese navy and the desire to demonstrate national ambitions in general.

SLORC became interested in ASEAN as a means of balancing China and to ameliorate the isolation in which it found itself after it had annulled the results of the elections of 27 May 1990, which gave Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) a clear majority. Intelligence Chief Lt.-General Khin Nyunt during his visit to Singapore in May 1993 requested an invitation for Myanmar to attend ASEAN meetings.(33) Indonesia and Singapore reacted positively and the process of drawing Myanmar more closely into ASEAN was initiated. For Indonesia the important factor was strategic in that it was felt necessary to wean Myanmar away from China which would otherwise obtain the ability to intrude into the region. Singapore's interest was trade and investment as shown in Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong's visit to Yangon in March 1994 during which he declared that Myanmar was a high priority for Singaporean businessmen.(34) Thailand's interest was the stability of the 2,400-km border with Myanmar as well as border trade.(35)

While the Western world condemned SLORC for human rights abuses, ASEAN leaders tended to emphasize the importance of maintaining stability in that country. The ASEAN perspective is that a precipitate democratization of Myanmar would raise the spectre of another Bosnia as the country would collapse into its constituent ethnic groups. This concern motivated ASEAN foreign ministers at the 26th AMM in Manila in July 1993 to declare that the stability of Myanmar was "crucial for regional security."(36) It also serves as the rationale for

the ASEAN policy of "constructive engagement" of Myanmar which has provoked much criticism from the West and within ASEAN as well. This policy assumes that association with ASEAN would be a stimulant for political change in Myanmar and an incentive for SLORC to mend its ways. Under this policy Myanmar was granted observer status in ASEAN during the 29th AMM held in Jakarta 20-21 July 1996, and was also admitted to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) on 23 July.

ASEAN membership for Myanmar places the organization in the invidious position of being an international advocate for SLORC and a defender of inexcusable human rights violations. In this sense SLORC has benefited considerably from "constructive engagement" while organizational interest demands that ASEAN countries assume the role of a guardian for future members. Within Thailand, proximity to Myanmar and the presence of student refugees from SLORC has generated much criticism of the amorality of "constructive engagement." When Aung San Suu Kyi was released by SLORC from house arrest on 10 July 1995, it appeared to acting Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan that "constructive engagement" had paid dividends.(37) Subsequently, however, as the NLD (National League for Democracy) was preparing for its congress scheduled for 26-29 May 1996, SLORC cracked down on the democracy movement and 262 delegates were arrested. Aung San Suu Kyi declared on 26 May that the NLD would hold regular party congresses and would draft a constitution for Myanmar. On 7 June SLORC responded by promulgating a new law which banned public meetings, demonstrations and threats to public order.

These events occurred immediately before the 29th AMM and the 3rd ARF which had been scheduled for July. SLORC was using ASEAN to protect its own position internationally and to deflect pressure from the West. Confident of ASEAN support, SLORC could act against the NLD knowing that ASEAN leaders could not back down once they had publicly committed themselves to "constructive engagement." ASEAN leaders accordingly insisted that the issue was an internal one for Myanmar and that the principle of noninterference in the domestic affairs of member countries applied.(38) Aung San Suu Kyi wrote to ASEAN leaders before the annual series of meetings asking that they consider economic sanctions against SLORC, a demand that was supported by the Western delegations at the ARF. EU Vice President Manuel Marin warned ASEAN that ties with the EU could be undermined by its support for SLORC.(39) Nonetheless, to Warren Christopher's consternation the issue did not appear on the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) agenda and the Canadian proposal to establish a group to negotiate with Yangon was sidelined.(40) Similarly, though the issue was discussed at the 3rd ARF, it did not reach Ali Alatas's report, which mentioned only Myanmar's membership of the forum. The Western desire to condemn SLORC had been muted by its involvement with regional mechanisms in which ASEAN views had to be accommodated. Myanmar Foreign Minister Ohn Gyaw had, indeed, correctly predicted that the West would draw back from the threat to apply punitive measures to SLORC now that Myanmar had attained observer status with ASEAN.(41) Ohn declared that Myanmar would be ready to become a full member of ASEAN by the end of 1998, but ASEAN ministers were reluctant to set a deadline. Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir, however, has announced that he expects Myanmar to join ASEAN as a full member in 1997.(42)

SLORC has used ASEAN as a way of managing international criticism which places ASEAN in a dilemma. To apply the principle of noninterference into Myanmar's affairs gives SLORC a degree of international protection and legitimacy which would enable the regime to arrest all movement towards democracy. After a meeting with SLORC Premier General Than Shwe, Mahathir argued that Myanmar's entry into ASEAN would accelerate economic and political change and that "constructive engagement" had improved conditions there.(43) It is a judgment not shared by all within ASEAN circles as it is understood that the issue tarnishes the organization's international image. Within ASEAN, particularly in Thailand, there is the view that conditions should have been imposed on Myanmar's entry into ASEAN as an observer and into the ARF as a full member.(44) Its unconditional acceptance into the ASEAN

structure is opposed by outspoken democratic and human rights groups that have arisen in Thailand, the Philippines and to a lesser extent in Indonesia. Myanmar may trigger conflict between the diplomatic leadership of ASEAN and democratic movements and human rights groups within the ASEAN countries which could disrupt the facade of unanimity that ASEAN presents to the world. To reaffirm its international credibility, ASEAN may have to deny unconditional support to members on all occasions and could eventually establish certain regionally acceptable criteria of behaviour.

ASEAN AND AFTA

After the Cambodian issue was resolved, ASEAN regionalism became in part economics driven, reflecting the changed global environment as well as heightened domestic expectations. The turn towards economics as a basis for regionalism brings with it organizational and functional difficulties that will demand urgent resolution within the near future. First, economics-based regionalism makes sense only in an open environment and operates, depending on the circumstances, on the principle of "the more the merrier." Economics pushes regionalism towards greater openness which undermines the specific regional criteria that from the beginning have defined ASEAN. In this sense APEC poses a challenge to ASEAN on the basis that wider Asia-Pacific economic regionalism offers greater benefits to the export-orientated economies of ASEAN. Secondly, there is concern about domestic reactions to ASEAN timetables for trade liberalization as in the case of Indonesia. Thirdly, ASEAN absorption of Vietnam and Myanmar will create new friction as these controlled economies are brought into contact with the free markets of ASEAN.

For some economists within ASEAN the initial experience of APEC persuaded them that an ASEAN economics-based regionalism was unnecessary. The author encountered the radical view amongst some economists that APEC would actually displace ASEAN, which had served its purpose during the Cambodian issue. The challenge posed induced ASEAN leaders to impose certain conditions on their participation within APEC to ensure the viability of ASEAN. During the 22nd AMM in July 1990, Ali Alatas insisted that APEC should be a loose consultative process that would not dilute ASEAN's identity. As the Indonesian foreign minister stated, ASEAN did not want "to precipitate moves to institutionalize this wider economic cooperation. This will be the basis of ASEAN's participation in the APEC meeting in Singapore [in Nov. 1990]."(45) President Suharto declared that Indonesia had rejected the idea of an APEC that would restrict the role of existing regional bodies. APEC, he said, would work in parallel with ASEAN.(46)

For these reasons ASEAN leaders have insisted, as the communique from the 28th AMM of July 1995 put it, that "ASEAN should play a central role in APEC."(47) ASEAN economic ministers have called for a unified position over APEC which would place ASEAN at the core of Asia-Pacific economic regionalism.(48) A certain broad unity was observable within ASEAN in relation to the demands of Western members of APEC, and in that sense ASEAN could act collectively. ASEAN leaders were in general agreement that APEC should remain as an informal consultative body and should not be transformed into a trade forum, which could be used by the U.S. against them.(49) This broad consensus was not particular or limited to ASEAN, however, and reflected opinion in the wider Asia-Pacific region. Thai economist Narongchai Akranasee claimed that APEC was divided into the "Anglo Saxon" states, which wanted APEC to be a trade institution, and the "Asian" states which opposed them.(50) Similarly, ASEAN economic ministers before the Bogor APEC summit of November 1994 resisted the recommendations of the Eminent Person's Group (EPG) which called for accelerated trade liberalization.(51) The economic ministers felt that APEC could threaten the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) which had been promulgated in January 1992. APEC was indeed a stimulus for the economic ministers to accelerate tariff reductions under AFTA. At the twenty-sixth meeting of ASEAN economic ministers in Chiang Mai in September 1994, it was agreed to shorten the tariff reduction timetable for AFTA from fifteen to ten years with

the deadline at 2003 (for tariffs above 20 percent). They also agreed to include all agricultural products within AFTA, which remedied the initial exclusion of unprocessed agricultural products from the agreement.(52)

Beyond these areas of agreement, however, APEC has exposed deep rifts within ASEAN in terms of the perceived benefits of economic regionalism. Mahathir's proposal for an East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), first announced as an economic grouping in December 1990, was motivated by a fear that economic regionalism would be dominated by the West. The 25th AMM of July 1992 accepted the idea of the EAEC as a caucus within APEC as a concession to Mahathir but relations with the other ASEAN leaders have been aggravated accordingly. A purely Asian grouping that would give vent to Mahathir's grievances against the West has been opposed by the rest of ASEAN as it would exclude major trading partners, the U.S. above all. Malaysia has also been opposed to target dates within APEC and insisted upon a separate annex to the Bogor APEC summit communique which emphasized voluntary compliance with the 2010/2020 split deadlines for APEC tariff reductions.(53) Singapore and Thailand, however, identify more with the West than with Malaysia over this position and generally support accelerated tariff reductions that would go beyond existing levels. Moreover, as an agricultural exporter Thailand has called for the inclusion of unprocessed agricultural products within the APEC tariff reduction scheme and has sought U.S. support over this issue.(54) Over agriculture, Thailand sides with the West to the disquiet of Indonesia and the Philippines which are concerned about their rice farmers.

ASEAN unity cannot be expected over all APEC-related issues as the organization embraces diverse economies and competing domestic needs. Economic coalitions will be established in the future that will cut across institutional lines and will make an ASEAN position more difficult to identify. Fundamental differences exist between the globalists, such as Singapore and Thailand, and countries such as Indonesia which call for a slower pace in terms of trade liberalization. Both Singapore and Thailand have been frustrated by the slow pace of economic liberalization within ASEAN and have advocated the development of an economic regionalism that goes beyond the narrow focus of AFTA. For this reason Singapore's Goh Chock Tong declared that ASEAN had lost its position at the head of the trade liberalization process.(55) Thailand and Malaysia have proposed an ASEAN services agreement that would include financial services, telecommunications, tourism and construction as the next step in the process of economic integration.(56) Without movement towards the liberalization of services the globalists within ASEAN would be prompted to develop trade and economic linkages outside the organization.

The position of Indonesia deserves special examination in any analysis of ASEAN regionalism. Traditionally a strongly protectionist state, Indonesia under Suharto has surprised observers with its declared commitment to trade liberalization. Up to 1992 Suharto resisted ASEAN efforts towards trade liberalization and then accepted AFTA when the challenges posed by China, NAFTA and APEC were understood. Suharto promoted APEC trade liberalization against the resistance of Indonesia's bureaucracy and has presided over a series of reform measures intended to open up the economy to external investment. In August 1995, however, Indonesia's agricultural minister Sjarifudin Baharsjah announced the exclusion of fifteen categories of agricultural products from AFTA which were placed on a temporary exclusion listing,(57) explaining that the measure was required to protect Indonesia's small farmers. Indonesia wanted all fifteen products on the sensitive list subject to later review but Thailand objected. Products on the sensitive list may remain indefinitely excluded from AFTA, unless ASEAN agrees to a deadline for their inclusion which is yet to come. Thailand threatened to withdraw its products from AFTA and to place them on the sensitive list if Indonesia went ahead with this move. A compromise was reached and a new category was created called the "temporary exclusion list" which would be reviewed in 2003.(58) Indonesia's move came at a time when AFTA was being extended to cover all agricultural products and demonstrated the extent to which domestic political forces could intrude into the AFTA

process.

In Indonesia those domestic political forces arise from two areas. The protection of small farmers has strong support within the Indonesian bureaucracy and former Trade Minister S. B. Joedono at one stage claimed that rice would always be on Indonesia's sensitive list. He revealed that disagreements existed over Indonesia's position in relation to APEC and the inclusion of agriculture in the trade liberalization process.⁽⁵⁹⁾ Secondly, some of the products withdrawn from AFTA are handled by monopolies connected with the president's family. The clove trade in Indonesia is controlled by the president's second son Hutomo Mandala Putra through an agency called BPPC while the wheat flour monopoly is held by Bogasari flour mills, owned by the politically well-connected Salim group. Tariff liberalization conflicts with interests of these monopolies, which are likely to assert themselves as ASEAN economic ministers move to extend AFTA to embrace all agricultural products.

Vietnam's entry into AFTA will be a source of similar difficulties. ASEAN has launched a bold and unprecedented attempt to integrate a centrally planned economy ruled by a Communist party elite with some of the most dynamic free market economies in the world. The path will be fraught with difficulties and will not be a smooth one. Initially, many within ASEAN were skeptical about Vietnam and, like the then Thai Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun, believed that it should develop a market economy first before it joins a grouping of free market economies.⁽⁶⁰⁾ Nonetheless, the alternative approach prevailed, promoted by subsequent Thai leaders and Goh Chok Tong who regarded ASEAN membership as a means of hastening the process of market reform in Vietnam. When Vietnam formally entered ASEAN in July 1995, it was specified that it would also join AFTA as of 1 January 1996 with the deadline for completed tariff reductions set at 2006. Vietnam was given a three-year grace period to comply with AFTA which was rather optimistic under the circumstances. On 18 December 1995 Vo Van Kiet announced the first concrete step towards AFTA with the first round of tariff reductions.⁽⁶¹⁾ The extent to which Vietnam can comply with AFTA while the higher party leadership remains divided over economic reform is uncertain. Premier Vo Van Kiet as a reformer is strongly opposed by the party conservatives such as President Le Duc Anh who has stressed the need to protect Vietnam's "national economic interests."⁽⁶²⁾ During the 8th Party Congress of June-July 1996, the conflict between reformers and conservatives intensified, indicating a fundamental contradiction between the political system and economic trends that has to be resolved before Vietnam can be successfully integrated with ASEAN.⁽⁶³⁾ ASEAN may have to develop a two-tiered structure for its free trade agreement which will take into account the realities of Vietnam's position.

A particular structural problem has arisen within ASEAN which requires attention if the organization is to function effectively. The problem is the result of the elevation of economics to one of the major functions of ASEAN while the organizational structure was originally intended to handle diplomatic issues. An absence of coordination has been noted between the foreign ministers and the economic ministers who meet in different fora. Economic ministers complained that they were not consulted about the 4th ASEAN-EU meeting in September 1994 though economic issues were discussed.⁽⁶⁴⁾ Foreign ministers deal with economic issues in the AMMs and in discussions with dialogue partners in the PMC, on the basis of proposals elaborated by the economic ministers. Mahathir at one stage did propose that the status of the economic ministers be upgraded so that they, rather than the foreign ministers, deal with economic issues and meet with dialogue partners.⁽⁶⁵⁾ This proposal, however, has yet to be implemented and the problem of structural duplication remains. ASEAN may cope more effectively with economic issues if the economic ministers were given a prominent role within the organizational structure.

ASEAN AND THE SECURITY OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC

The recognition that ASEAN's security is a function of the stability of the wider Asia Pacific

region gives rise to particular dilemmas for the organization. During the cold war years ASEAN's security concerns were focused on Indochina and the role of external actors in creating internal instability. Those concerns go well beyond Southeast Asia today and relate to China's regional role, the South China Sea and the Korean Peninsula, yet the organization on its own is hardly in a position to address these problems. An overarching Asia-Pacific security regionalism which has been repeatedly proposed would seem an obvious answer to the security needs of the individual members of ASEAN, but it threatens to make the organization superfluous. ASEAN leaders recognize that their security to a considerable extent would depend on an Asia-Pacific security dialogue that would involve all major actors, but they strive to protect their organization from the consequences. They have acted to ensure that the development of Asia-Pacific security regionalism would be grafted upon existing regional structures, which are to be expanded and strengthened accordingly. Despite such efforts, considerable tension exists between current security requirements, which dictate a commitment to an Asia-Pacific dialogue, and ASEAN's organizational interests, which will require some adjustment to the role of ASEAN.

ASEAN leaders have been very conscious of the danger that an Asia-Pacific security dialogue would result in the displacement of the organization. At the 26th AMM Goh Chok Tong stressed that ASEAN must not allow its future to be decided by external powers and emphasized the need to maintain organizational cohesion.⁽⁶⁶⁾ At the 5th ASEAN summit, held in Bangkok in December 1995, Mahathir declared that ASEAN should insist on an appropriate share in the management of regional affairs, and that it should guard against becoming "a pawn" in global politics.⁽⁶⁷⁾ With this in mind ASEAN leaders have attempted to orchestrate the development of regional security dialogue in a way that would retain the regional organization as its central feature. Asia-Pacific security dialogue has used ASEAN as a stable foundation, which is a tribute to the organization's success on the one hand but results in particular frustrations on the other.

The ARF was an attempt to meet the need for Asia-Pacific security regionalism while maintaining the ASEAN structure. External actors recognized that ASEAN was the only effective substructure for an Asia-Pacific security dialogue and were willing to accommodate ASEAN needs in this respect. According to the 27th AMM of July 1994, the ARF was to become "an effective consultative Asia-Pacific forum for promoting open dialogue on political and security cooperation in the region."⁽⁶⁸⁾ The first meeting of the ARF was in Bangkok on 25 July 1994; it is now regularly scheduled with the AMMs held in ASEAN capitals on a rotating basis. Within ASEAN the point is emphasized that regional security dialogue is conducted under the organization's aegis and requires that the foreign ministers of external powers travel to an ASEAN capital.⁽⁶⁹⁾ In this spirit the 28th AMM "re-emphasized ASEAN's role as the primary driving force of the ARF."⁽⁷⁰⁾

Several problems have arisen with the ARF which have become evident over the past year. First, the ARF overlaps with the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) which is an annual dialogue conducted between ASEAN and the ten dialogue partners, all of whom are ARF members as well.⁽⁷¹⁾ Japanese Foreign Minister Yukihiko Ikeda at the PMC of July 1996 complained about the overlap with the ARF, noting that "it is essential to clarify the division of responsibilities to be taken by these two fora."⁽⁷²⁾ The PMC meetings were originally intended to promote dialogue on economic issues with major trading partners of ASEAN, and economic status has been the main criterion for PMC membership. When ASEAN decided in July 1991 to include security as a topic for the PMC dialogue process and then created the ARF in 1993, the current duplication was the result. The Thai Foreign Ministry has claimed that the PMC will examine global issues while the ARF will focus upon regional security, a distinction that has been lost in practice.

Besides the structural problem there is the issue of the ARF's role and function. ASEAN leaders regard the ARF as a means to engage China and as a way of inculcating habits of

dialogue for a leadership whose actions could have momentous consequences for the region. The ARF has so far been occupied with establishing the mechanics of dialogue without examining the pressing security issues that require attention. At the 2nd ARF of 1 August 1995, ASEAN's position paper on regional security was accepted which called for the implementation of specific CBMs, preventive diplomacy, and the publication of defence white papers by members.(73) It was also agreed that various ad hoc working groups would be established between ARF meetings to examine proposals for CBMs.(74) At the 3rd ARF on 23 July 1996, Ali Alatas stressed that the forum would be developed in stages, which would entail the promotion of CBMs and preventive diplomacy as well as the "elaboration of approaches to conflict resolution." (75)

While the ARF is to develop a conducive atmosphere for later dialogue, the basic issue of China's role in the South China Sea is not being addressed. There may be some logic to the idea that contentious issues should be avoided to allow the ARF to become established without disruption. If the forum is to sidestep those issues it was established to address, however, what possible success can its proponents claim? China's occupation of Mischief Reef, which was revealed on 9 February 1995, was a test case, but both ASEAN and China prevented the issue from being raised at the ARF. At the ARF Senior Officials Meeting (SOMS) of May 1995, ASEAN members rejected the Philippine attempt to forge a collective position over the issue. The Chinese delegation insisted that the issue should not reach the final report and that it was to be resolved bilaterally, certainly not collectively.(76) Permanent secretary of Brunei's Foreign Ministry Dato Lim Jock Seng, who chaired the meeting, declared that confrontation with China was to be avoided as ASEAN members reportedly went out of their way to avoid any tensions with the Chinese delegation.(77) Before the 2nd ARF, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen met with his ASEAN counterparts on 30th July and insisted upon China's "indisputable sovereignty" over the Spratly Islands. He revealed, however, that China would accept the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS II) as a basis for a settlement.(78) Nonetheless, the Chinese Foreign Minister continued to stress that the ARF was not an appropriate forum to discuss the claims and again called for bilateral negotiations.(79) Within ASEAN this action was interpreted to mean that China would no longer claim the entire South China Sea and would limit its claims to the islands. On this basis some accommodation might be negotiated that would allow for overlapping claims to the surrounding sea.(80) The ambiguity of China's declaration dampened an enthusiastic ASEAN response and the report of the 2nd ARF simply noted that members "expressed concern over overlapping sovereignty claims in the region" and urged claimants to reaffirm their commitment to relevant international laws and conventions.(81)

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord observed that the ARF should face the South China Sea issue if it was to be a "credible organization." (82) Singapore's foreign minister S. Jayakumar agreed that the ARF eventually would have to grapple with sensitive issues which, as he said, would be a test of the maturity of the participants.(83) Nonetheless, with the endorsement of ASEAN foreign ministers, Ali Alatas has justified the exclusion of sensitive issues from the forum on the grounds that the ARF is a consultative body, and not a multilateral forum that is intended to resolve security problems.(84) Torn between the need to address troubling security issues and the desire to protect a newly established forum from dissolution, ASEAN leaders hope that the ARF may gain in effectiveness with time. In the meantime, China may undertake further action in the South China Sea which could demonstrate the inefficacy of the forum and might prevent its consolidation. On 15 May 1996 China announced that the National People's Congress had ratified the Law of the Sea and had authorized the drawing of baselines around its sea claims in the South China Sea. A 320-km sea zone was drawn around the Paracels which overlapped with Philippine and Vietnamese claims.(85) The Spratly Islands were excluded from this exercise but may be included later. Vietnam and the Philippines both protested and Malaysian Foreign Minister Datuk Abdullah Ahmad Badawi asked for clarification at the PMC. At the 3rd ARF, however, the matter was carefully circumvented.(86) The Chinese presence on Mischief Reef remains

and the Philippines in May 1996 accused China of building two new structures there, in addition to the four platforms revealed in February 1995.(87)

While China takes incremental steps to strengthen its position in the South China Sea, the need remains for a mechanism which can engage its leaders in a meaningful way. The series of annual informal workshops on the South China Sea hosted by Indonesia since 1990 involving eleven countries (ASEAN, China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos) has so far had little impact upon official positions.(88) There are other issues as well which affect ASEAN, such as the Beijing-Taiwan conflict and the Korean Peninsula, which are not being adequately addressed by existing structures. ASEAN leaders have resisted pressure from the U.S., Canada and Australia to institutionalize the ARF and to transform it into a place where these issues could be discussed. Malaysia's Badawi denounced what he described as attempts to take the ARF away from ASEAN and to direct its development in a way contrary to ASEAN's interests.(89) Singapore's Jayakumar similarly insisted that ASEAN should stay in the "driver's seat" of the ARF.(90)

While the inadequacy of the ARF persists, pressure will continue to arise from external actors to develop alternative dialogue structures which would be better able to handle the above issues. It is difficult to imagine how ASEAN can stay in the driver's seat in the face of the widely felt need for a dialogue system that would cover Northeast Asian security issues. The Japanese in particular feel that the salient security issues of the Asia-Pacific region require a broader dialogue structure that is not hampered by ASEAN's insistence that it remain in control. Japan's Foreign Minister Yukihiko Ikeda has stressed the need for a new security mechanism that would provide a framework for negotiations over the Taiwan Straits and the Korean Peninsula.(91) Taiwan's Lee Teng-hui proposed an Asia-Pacific security forum in March 1993 and again in August 1995. U.S. Defence Secretary William Perry in November 1995 raised a proposal that had been earlier aired in 1992 by Thailand's Anand Panyarachun and Australia's Paul Keating when he suggested that APEC be transformed into a defence forum.

The dilemma for ASEAN is that an appropriate dialogue body for these issues would be an Asia-Pacific forum that would focus on Northeast Asia and which would allow the major actors, the U.S., Japan and Korea, to shape the agenda. Only in this context, if at all, would it be possible to raise the sensitive issues which ASEAN avoids and to engage China in meaningful discussion. A forum that focuses on Northeast Asian issues could relegate a Southeast Asian regional body such as ASEAN to the sidelines. The ARF may perform a useful function in establishing the first stage of dialogue and in bringing together the various dialogue partners within a relatively neutral framework. In this sense ASEAN's role may be important in terms of the initial stimulus towards dialogue. Unless the second stage of meaningful dialogue begins, the pressure for the establishment of a separate Asia-Pacific forum to address these issues will become irresistible.

THE FUTURE

ASEAN will face three major challenges, the responses to which will define its future role and function. The expansion of the organization will probably result in an adjustment of past practice within ASEAN so that members are not obliged to support each other in all circumstances. Most ASEAN members have cultivated economic relationships with China and should a territorial conflict emerge between Vietnam and that country, they would be reluctant to get involved. A similar reluctance may become evident in the case of Myanmar where ASEAN has been manipulated by the military regime to bolster its international legitimacy. ASEAN cannot adopt a higher diplomatic profile internationally without facing increasing pressure from the international community to modify its approach towards Myanmar. For these reasons the expansion of the organization will change it into a loose structure that will allow considerable discretion for individual states or subgroups. The historical division

between mainland and maritime Southeast Asia may become accentuated to the point where subgroups based on this division emerge.

Economics will similarly change the organization but in other ways. The attempted integration of Indochina and eventually Myanmar into AFTA will create particular difficulties and in this respect the organization has been excessively sanguine about the prospects for Vietnam. AFTA may develop a two-level structure to accommodate the inevitable problems that will be encountered with Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and later with Myanmar. Moreover, the borders of economic regionalism do not necessarily coincide with security regionalism. ASEAN as an economic body has developed wider interests than ASEAN as a security grouping and tensions can be noted between the two conceptions of regionalism. Security regionalism is generally defined in terms of geography and proximity while economic regionalism is a flexible arrangement that is much more broadly based. In this case the emphasis upon economic regionalism, regarded by many ASEAN economists as a step towards global trade liberalization, undermines the inclusive feature of Southeast Asian regionalism based upon a specific regional identity. As the economic interests of ASEAN members broaden and involve the development of external linkages, the organization may shed the characteristics of being a Southeast Asian body. The open nature of economic regionalism leads ASEAN beyond its Southeast Asian role and will give rise to new problems of identity.

In terms of security the existing multilevel structure which places ASEAN at the centre of the ARF cannot meet currently expressed needs. The issues of China's future role in the region, or in the Korean Peninsula, are unable to find a place in a regional structure that evades controversy. While the ARF remains incapable of coping with these issues, pressure will mount for an alternative regional body, such as the Northeast Asia security forum, which would avoid the restrictions imposed by ASEAN sensitivities. An attempt by ASEAN to monopolize Asia-Pacific regionalism, after having promoted its initiation, could create considerable resentment from external actors such as the U.S. and Japan who feel that their concerns are not receiving adequate attention in the current structure. Either the ARF allows these important issues to be raised or it will in time be replaced by another forum, or by alternative negotiating channels.

The problems faced by ASEAN today are, in the main, a result of an attempt to adjust what was in the 1980s a small subregional association with limited functions to a major Asia-Pacific actor embracing an array of open-ended functions. The structure and the mechanisms that evolved within ASEAN to cope with the problems of the seventies and eighties are plainly inadequate today when the organization has taken upon itself a high-profile role. ASEAN has emerged as an international actor in its own right, establishing ties with Europe through the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), which was held in Bangkok in February-March 1996, and with Australia/New Zealand through the Closer Economic Relations (CER) mechanism. An ASEAN structure that was fashioned in another era will have to accommodate new members and additional external relationships which will entail a proliferation of meetings and conferences for which the organization is not prepared. As the organization embraces all ten Southeast Asian states, the PMC and the ARF will similarly expand. Already Pakistan and Taiwan have asked for full dialogue status with the PMC, Mexico has requested sectoral dialogue partner status and Egypt and Turkey have expressed a similar interest. Mongolia, North Korea, Britain and France have indicated their desire to join the ARF, and Pakistan may follow. The danger is that the ARF will become, in Thai Foreign Minister Amnuay Virawan's words, a "second UN" with all the attendant difficulties of rigid formality and ineffectualness.⁽⁹²⁾ How ASEAN can manage to coordinate the interests of its members in this proliferating organizational structure is yet to be seen.

Several developments may be anticipated as a consequence of the above pressures. The organizational structure will have to be adjusted to the realities of increased membership in order to remove duplication between ministerial bodies and to improve coordination at all

levels. The consensus rule may have to give way to the majority rule over crucial issues to allow effective decision making, and the time spent on the formalities of the annual meetings will have to be reduced. Secondly, ASEAN will become a broad umbrella association which will include various coalitions based on economic or security interests. Subgroups within ASEAN will probably act in tandem with external Asia-Pacific allies on the basis of wider concepts of economic anti security regionalism. A complex situation is likely where subgroups coalesce under the ASEAN aegis and various negotiating coalitions may arise that may seek external allies. ASEAN may then overlap and merge with other Asia-Pacific regional processes to which its members will be inevitably attracted.

Ultimately, the widely accepted view of ASEAN as a limited form of regionalism described as old regionalism will have to be discarded to accommodate the rapidly changing nature of the organization. ASEAN should be viewed as a participant or actor in the process of transition towards a comprehensive Asia Pacific regionalism which has been regarded as new regionalism. As the economic, diplomatic and security linkages ASEAN has established with external actors become more important, as individual members are integrated into wider economic and security networks through APEC or the ARF, the organization will undergo a profound change. As a participant in the emerging new regionalism of the Asia Pacific, ASEAN would have a major function in shaping expectations and influencing developments. It would be short-sighted for ASEAN countries to insist upon the exclusive character of their organization, or to preserve the practices and organizational structure with which they have become familiar. It is in this sense that ASEAN's contribution to the region may not be a consequence of its ability to assume the role of an Asia-Pacific actor but in providing a platform and a stimulant for the Asia-Pacific's new regionalism.

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3 On the distinction between the old and new regionalism, see Norman D. Palmer, *The New Regionalism in Asia and the Pacific* (Lexington: 1991), p. 3. Bjorn Hettne and Andras Inotai, *The New Regionalism: Implications for Global Development and International Security* (Helsinki: United Nations University, 1994), pp. 1-2. Jaime de Melo, Arvind Panagariya, Dani Rodrik, *The New Regionalism: A Country Perspective* (Country Economics Dept., World Bank, February 1993). James H. Mittelman, "Rethinking the 'New Regionalism' in the Context of Globalization," *Global Governance*, vol. 2. no. 2, May-Aug., 1996.

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5 On 8 August 1967, ASEAN was comprised of Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore. Brunei joined upon attaining independence from Britain on 1 January 1994.

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7 Papua New Guinea has had "Special Observer" status with ASEAN since 1989. Its leaders intend to upgrade its status with ASEAN to "Permanent Associate" but membership is excluded while it is considered part of the South Pacific region. See *Jakarta Post*, 22 July 1996.

8 *Jakarta Post*, 22 July 1996.

9 *Straits Times*, 28 July 1995.

10 On Vietnam's hope that ASEAN would provide support against China see Hoang Anh Tuan, "Vietnam's Membership in ASEAN: Economic, Political and Security Implications," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, vol. 16, no. 3 (December 1994). On the perception of China as Vietnam's greatest threat see Jacques Bekaert, "VN and China: Towards Peaceful Coexistence," *Bangkok Post*, 21 January 1993; also Hoang Anh Tuan, *Straits Times*, 29 August 1994.

11 *Straits Times*, 26 October 1994. See also Hoang Anh Tuan, "Vietnam's Membership of ASEAN.

12 *Japan Times*, 30 November 1995; *Sunday Times (Singapore)*, 3 December 1995.

13 On the 14 March 1988 clash see *Bangkok Post*, 7 April 1988.

14 *New Straits Times*, 27 June 1992.

15 See *Straits Times*, 19 July 1994; *Far Eastern Economic Review* (henceforth FEER), 13 October 1995.

16 FEER, 25 April 1996.

17 On ASEAN economic relations with China and their importance for individual members see John Wong, "China in the Dynamic Asia-Pacific Region," *Pacific Review*, vol. 8, no. 4 (1995). For the broader ASEAN strategy of engaging China see Jusuf Wanandi, "ASEAN's China Strategy: Towards Deeper Engagement," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, vol. 38, no. 3 (Autumn 1996).

18 *Straits Times*, 1 June 1995, 1 September 1995.

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20 See Nayan Chanda, "The Enemy Within," FEER, 22 August 1996.

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29 On SLORC weapons purchases from China see Jane's Defence Weekly, 13 September 1990; Bertil Lintner, "SLORC Salvation," FEER, 3 October 1991; and Straits Times, 11 December 1991.

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35 Apichai Puntasen, "Old Ghosts Continue to Haunt Thai-Burma Relations," Nation, 25 March 1996.

36 South China Morning Post, 28 July 1993.

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38 On ASEAN reactions to SLORC's crackdown, see Straits Times Interactive, 30 May, 1 June, 15 June 1996.

39 Jakarta Post, 23 July 1996.

40 Ibid., 26 July 1996.

41 Ibid., 23 July 1996.

42 Straits Times Interactive, 13 August 1996.

43 Business Times (on line), 16 August 1996.

44 See Anurat Manibhandu, Nussara Sawatsawang, Saritdet Marukatat, "ASEAN Role for Burma Poses Credibility Risk," Bangkok Post, 20 July 1996.

45 Straits Times, 25 July 1990.

46 Antara News Agency 231/A, 9 August 1993.

47 Communiqué from 28th AMM, 29-30 August 1995 Bandar Seri Begawan, Twenty-Eighth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, ASEAN Regional Forum, Post-Ministerial Conferences with Dialogue Partners ASEAN Regional Forum, Brunei Darussalam, 1995, p. 90.

48 Bangkok Post, 29 April 1995.

49 Straits Times, 9 October 1993.

50 Bangkok Post, 2 November 1994.

51 Ibid., 9 November 1994.

52 See Joint Press Statement, The Twenty-Sixth Meeting of the ASEAN Economic Ministers, 22-23 September 1994, ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta. Also FEER, 6 October 1994.

53 Straits Times, 16 November 1994.

54 Bangkok Post, 2 October 1995.

55 Straits Times, 15 December 1995.

56 Jakarta Post, 9 September 1995, Bangkok Post, 1 September 1995.

57 The fifteen products included five categories of sugar, five categories of rice, wheat, wheat flour, soybean flour, garlic, cloves; Jakarta Post, 5 August 1995.

58 Jakarta Post, 11 December 1995.

59 Nation, 9 September 1995.

60 See Anand's remarks in Hanoi and Singapore, Bangkok Post, 17, 26 January 1992.

61 Bangkok Post, 30 December 1995.

62 Ibid., 29 May 1996.

63 On Vietnam's 8th Party Congress see Adam Schwarz, "Safety First," FEER, 11 July 1996.

64 Bangkok Post, 23 September 1994.

65 Straits Times, 9 October 1992.

66 Business Times, 24 July 1993.

67 Bangkok Post, 15 December 1995.

68 Sunday Times, 24 July 1994.

69 There were eighteen original members of the ARF. They were the six ASEAN countries, the U.S., China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Russia, the EU, Canada, PNG, Laos and Vietnam. Cambodia joined in July 1995 and India and Myanmar followed in July 1996 to bring the current membership to twenty-one.

70 See joint communique of the 28th AMM in Twenty-Eighth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, p. 85.

71 ASEAN's ten dialogue partners include the U.S., Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, South Korea, and the E.U. In July 1996, China, Russia and India were included as full dialogue partners.

72 Opening Statement by H.E. Mr. Yukihiko Ikeda, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan. ASEAN-PMC, 24-25 July 1996.

73 Straits Times, 2 August 1995.

74 Jakarta Post, 4 August 1995.

75 Chairman's Statement, the Third Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum, Jakarta, 23 July 1995.

76 Straits Times, 24 May 1995.

77 Ibid., 23 May 1995.

78 FEER, 10 August 1995; Jakarta Post, 31 July 1995.

79 Jakarta Post, 31 July 1995.

80 Jusuf Wanandi, "ASEAN's China Strategy: Towards Deeper Engagement," *Survival*, vol. 38, no. 3, Autumn 1996.

81 Chairman's Statement of the Second Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam, 1 August 1995.

82 Straits Times, 19 May 1995.

83 Ibid., 26 July 1996.

84 Ibid., 27 July 1994.

85 Straits Times Interactive, 17 May 1996.

86 Qian Qichen explained at the 3rd ARF on 23 July 1996 that "China's National People's Congress ratified the U.N. convention of the Law of the Sea, and at the same time, the Chinese government announced the baselines of part of its territorial sea." See Statement by His Excellency Mr. Qian Qichen, Vice Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 3rd ASEAN Regional Forum, Jakarta, 23 July 1996.

87 Straits Times, 21 May 1996.

88 Seven workshops in the series entitled "Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea" have been held to date. The first was held in Denpasar in January 1990, the second in Bandung in July 1991, the third in Jogjakarta in July 1992, the fourth in Surabaya in August 1993, the fifth in Bukit Tinggi in October 1994, the sixth in Balikpapan in October 1995, and the seventh in Batam in December 1996. Attempts by Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas to upgrade the meetings to involve governments more directly have been resisted by China. See also Lee Lai To, "ASEAN and the South China Sea Conflicts," *Pacific Review*, vol. 8, no. 3 (1995).

89 Sunday Times, 30 July 1995.

90 Ibid., 4 August 1995.

91 Straits Times Interactive, 17 May 1996.

92 Bangkok Post, 15 July 1996.

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