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Introduction

The task of nation building has posed an enormous challenge for postcolonial Muslim leaders, especially for those committed to the creation of a nation based on Islamic rules, norms and visions. Conventional wisdom holds that the discrepancy between a "parochial" national framework -- based on religion -- and the modern reality of a nation-state framework is too great to be reconciled. The key issue here is how the Islamic rules of public organisation and governance can accommodate a multi-religious condition, one which is widespread in postcolonial nation-states. However, the role Islam plays in the nation -- more specifically, in the process of nation building -- differs strikingly across Muslim-majority countries. A variety of Islamic forces, across a wide range of ideological spectrums, strive for their visions of nationhood, both on ideological and institutional fronts. Some seek the creation of an "Islamic state": a state system based on the Islamic canons and tradition. Others adopt a less dogmatic approach, seeking to establish a moral order inspired by Islamic principles. Yet whether they can do so, and to what extent, depends not on the irrevocable influence of doctrinal forms, but on country-specific patterns of civil and state organisation. Further, as Hefner suggests, "most show the strong impact of state-society interactions that have evolved over the course of several decades of national independence." (1)

Since the onset of the financial crisis in 1997, political developments in the two Muslim-dominant countries in Southeast Asia -- Malaysia and Indonesia - have highlighted not only the salience of Islam for political and ideological expression; recent events have also emphasised a recurrent theme lingering in these countries after independence: the uneasy relationship between Islam and nation building.

In the Malaysian context, on the one hand the Islamic opposition party, PAS (Parti Islam Se-Malaysia or Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party) has drummed up the conception of an "Islamic state" against the incumbent administration of Mahathir Mohamad, particularly since the sacking and imprisonment of the former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim in September 1998. There is no doubt that Mahathir's credibility among the majority Muslim Malays has waned dramatically as a result. The PAS's commitment to its Islamic vision, however, not only continues to threaten the inherently frail coalition of opposition parties, Barisan Alternatif (Alternative Front, or BA), but also keeps the non-Muslim minorities on the alert. Their aspiration to break the overwhelming dominance of their common enemy, UMNO (United Malays National Organization) in the recent general election was powerful enough to maintain the opposition alliance. Yet its component parties' divergent visions of the national future -- especially the PAS's "Islamic state" vision -- has ultimately facilitated the withdrawal of the dominantly Chinese DAP (Democratic Action Party).

In Indonesia, on the other hand, Abdurrahman Wahid -- popularly known as Gus Dur - the

charismatic former leader of Indonesia's largest Islamic movement, the 30-million-strong Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), was elected as the first president of the Republic in the post-Suharto era on the back of the Central Axis coalition of Islamic parties. Anticipating persistent suspicion of a growing Islamic influence among the so-called "nationalist" clique, Gus Dur assured both domestic and international audiences that Islam would remain separate from the state, although, he noted, "this kind of thinking is shared only by a certain minority." (2) Further, his "secular-nationalist" successor Megawati Soekarnoputri continues to find herself vulnerable to pressures from the Islamic bloc in Parliament, leaving the national leadership highly fragmented.

Such recent episodes as these remind us, once again, of the persistently tense relations between Islamic and nationalist causes in a multi-religious/ethnic setting. It is, however, the widely contrasting trajectories of the position of Islam in postcolonial nation building in the two neighbouring countries that is the focus of this paper.

In Malaysia, the postcolonial national leadership instituted Islam as the official religion on gaining independence, thereby jealously safeguarding the ideological as well as the political supremacy of the Muslim Malays. Despite the adaptation, reinforcement, and more formal institutionalisation of the "exclusive" Bumiputera (3)-centric ideology in the aftermath of the May 1969 racial riots, Malaysia has witnessed a slowly yet steadily growing national consciousness in the past decade. (4) Furthermore, the country's comparatively stable ethnic relations proved important in aiding the national leadership in overcoming, with relative ease, the region-wide economic and political crisis which began in 1997.

In Indonesia, in stark contrast, the staunchly nationalistic postcolonial leaders led by President Sukarno chose from the beginning to put Islam aside and install Pancasila (5) as the philosophical foundation of the newly born Republic. This came about after long and heated debates which concluded that national unity would be threatened if one "exclusivist" ideology -- Islam in particular -- was espoused as the basis of the state for the religiously and ethnically highly fragmented "Indonesian" people. (6) Despite such strong nationalistic aspirations among the founding fathers, however, the recent inter - and intra-religious/ethnic/regional strife, which has engulfed many parts of the archipelago and left thousands dead, suggests that huge discrepancies still remain in the people's perception of their national (7)

The widely contrasting outcomes in the two neighbouring Muslim-majority countries in the region present a fundamental challenge to our conventional thinking on the relationship between Islam and nation building in a multireligious/ethnic setting. Conventional wisdom contends that Islam is unfit to form the foundation of a modern nation that transcends parochial religious sentiments. The Indonesian case seems to confirm this claim. Islam, indeed, proved to be a divisive force reinforcing religious-oriented parochial sentiments, despite the fact that Islam was put aside constitutionally and ideologically. The Malaysian case, on the other hand, largely defies our expectations. It demonstrates that Islam can be compatible with the process of modern nation building despite the fact that Islam was constitutionally instituted as the official religion to exclusively safeguard the hegemonic position of the Muslim Malays. More significantly, Malaysia under the current Prime Minister Mahathir offers us a case where the state both pledges support for Islamisation while reinforcing the emergence of nascent Malaysian nationalism. While many other Islamic forces - both in their own past and in other countries - failed to form a national force for a variety of reasons, Malaysia's pro-Islamic leadership, led by Mahathir, has managed to mobilise a comparatively strong "nationalistic" force. To better understand the much-disputed relations between Islam and nation-building in a multi-religious/ethnic setting, this cross-national variation in outcomes demands careful examination.

This paper seeks to find answers for the widely contrasting outcomes between Malaysia and Indonesia with regard to the position of Islam in the process of nation building. It identifies the

ways in which the two countries have embedded Islam into each state's project of nation building. The study draws special attention to the ideological disposition of the state leadership, and locates this in political as well as socio-economic spheres. In doing so, the paper suggests that the state's ideological appropriation of Islam has had an important role in bringing about the diverging outcomes of nation building. (8)

The central argument of this paper is as follows. In Malaysia, the Mahathir-led pro-Islamic state leadership managed to appropriate and incorporate Islam into their "national" vision by flexibly and pragmatically interpreting and rationalising the religious doctrines. Their practical implementation of these principles -- Islamic universalism in particular -- helped lay an inclusive ideological foundation for a newly emerging "Malaysian" nationhood. In Indonesia, on the other hand, the military-dominated Suharto regime generally -- but not always -- remained vigilant against and attempted to neutralise Islamic forces. It did this both on the organisational and ideological fronts, while failing to make full use of the essentially integrationist state national ideology, Pancasila. This "secular-nationalist" ideological stance has been adopted to a large extent even by post-Suharto administrations.

The paper makes this argument by examining four key factors that determined how state leaders in Malaysia and Indonesia dealt with the ideological forces of Islam: (1) nature of the political alignment, both on the domestic and international levels, in which state leadership and Islamic forces operated; (2) rapid industrialisation and modernisation initiated by the developmental state and the rise of a Muslim urban middle class; (3) the widespread trend of Islamisation within the Muslim communities, especially a surge in Islamic-related activities; and (4) the ideological underpinning of the nation-building enterprise by the national leadership and the position of Islam. Focus is largely placed on the Mahathir administration in Malaysia and the New Order regime under former President Suharto (and the post-Suharto administrations to a lesser extent) in Indonesia.

Malaysia: Inclusion of Islam

Islamisation of the Malaysian State

Under Mahathir, the Malaysian state experienced its most radical ideological readjustment since independence. Although the Muslim-Malay-centric nature of the UMNO government in many ways remains prominent, the latter's promotion of Bangsa Malaysia (the Malaysian nation) since the late 1980s marked a fundamental departure from the political and ideological manipulation of ethnicity which were a hallmark of postindependence Malaysian politics. The UMNO-dominant Malaysian leaders' ideological framework was long characterised by "exclusivist" Bumiputeraism-- the Muslim-Malay-centric ideology. This aimed above all to safeguard the Muslim Malays' political and cultural supremacy against the non-Muslims. The hegemonic position of the Muslim Malays was constitutionally guaranteed at independence, and further strengthened and officially institutionalised in the aftermath of the May 1969 racial riots. Most notable was the introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP), which promised to secure and uplift the Muslim Malay s' economic status as opposed to the non-Malays. (9) On constitutional grounds, Islam was instituted as the official religion in 1957; it played a key role in ensuring that the Muslim Malays kept the country as their own. Under this structure, ethno-centric nationalism was mobilised by ethnic-based political parties, and the non-Muslims -- the economically powerful Chinese in particular -- continued to be perceived as a potential threat to the Muslim Malay's hegemonic position. The hostile ethnic relations which ensued thwarted the birth of Malaysian nationalism. (10)

From the late 1980s on, however, the UMNO leadership's ideological and political outlook shifted from the Malay-centric Bumiputeraism to a more multi-ethnic and global approach. This was paralleled by the government's zealous commitment to "Islamisation," both on the domestic and international fronts. (11) Although a number of observers questioned the

genuineness of its religious cause or else played it down as a politically motivated act against Islamic critics -- especially PAS -- the Islamic character of the Mahathir government became especially pronounced in the early 1990s. Given the full patronage of the government, an Islamic think-tank, the IKIM (Institut Kefahaman Islam Malaysia or Malaysian Institute of Islamic Understanding) was established in 1992, and, together with other national Islamic agencies, spearheaded various programs to propagate more "progressive" Islamic views congruent with the UMNO's version of "modern" Islam. Further, the UMNO government launched an unprecedented degree of restructuring, both in scale and in scope, of Islamic institutions. The government tackled the key areas of: Shari'ah (Islamic) courts and the judicial establishment, mosques, religious schools and zakat (Islamic tithe) collection, as well as religious officialdom in general and ulama (Islamic scholars) in particular. (12) In contrast to the Indonesian case, the Malaysian state not only played a leading role in the course of Islamisation in society, but also began advertising itself as a model Islamic nation-state. (13)

The Mahathir government's commitment to the "Islamic" cause, however, raises an important question for our discussion of nation building in Malaysia's multi-religious/ethnic situation: how did the UMNO leadership manage to mobilise nationalistic sentiments among the religiously fragmented populace, while balancing these with their apparently contradictory "Islamic" cause? The following section examines factors accounting for this distinctive outcome.

The Centralisation of the Executive Under Mahathir

The first necessary factor was the centralisation of political and economic authority under the Prime Minister's Department. Increasing authoritarianism from the late 1980s onward -- coupled with the declining independence of the bureaucracy, legislature, judiciary and monarchy -- reinforced the predominance of UMNO within the state as well as in society at large. (14) The dramatically enhanced personal authority of Mahathir, alongside the consolidation of state power within the hegemonic UMNO, also raised the distributive capacities of the state through the concentration of economic resources under the party's control. Moreover, the nation's impressive recovery from its worst-ever recession in the mid-1980s and the subsequent "take off" of industrial development allowed a large number of big, and highly visible, "national" projects to be carried out throughout the country. These, in turn, acted as a catalyst in fostering stronger popular allegiance to the Mahathir government. (15) Most importantly, the concurrent process of institutionalising the state Islamic administrative apparatus involved the incorporation of an increasing number of government-employed ulama into the formal state structure. The expanded state religious bureaucracy came to regulate and further restrain free and diverse religion-related activities or expression in society. These developments consequently equipped Mahathir with enormous political and economic capacities to translate his personal vision of the nation into substantive public policy.

Under the Mahathir premiership, the twin causes of Islamisation and modernisation formed the backbone of the government's political, cultural and economic agenda, remodeled as a national vision intended to steer the whole nation to a common destiny. The UMNO government's national vision -- a combination of modern and global elements on the one hand, and conspicuously Islamic indigenous elements on the other -- symbolised Mahathir's self-ordained mission: to make Malaysia a developed country not only in economic but also in cultural terms. (16) This personal vision of the national future could not have been popularised as the "national" vision -- let alone realised nationwide -- without the dramatic expansion of political and economic resources under the Prime Minister's Office.

Globalisation of the Malaysian State: A "Threat" of the West?

The Mahathir government's propagation of Islamic concepts was a project launched against the backdrop of a changing world order. The post-cold war international context was

especially important in enabling Mahathir's provocative anti-imperialistic rhetoric against Western powers to work on the Malaysian public -- Muslim and non-Muslim alike -- at home. Two elements deserve particular attention in this context: (1) the globalisation of the Malaysian state, especially Malaysia's rising position in the world economy and the high profile of its leader, Mahathir; and (2) the growing currency of the "Clash of Civilizations" thesis and the popular perception of antagonism between Islam and the West. (17)

The rising economic power of the Eastern countries -- particularly those in Asia -- in the 1980s and 1990s helped awaken the so-called "Eastern" or "Asian" assertion. This was a time when the Western powers seemed to be in relative decline. (18) Though it was a Muslim-dominated country, Malaysia was at the same time a leading force in the thriving Asian economy. A changing balance of power in the world economy that favored Asia, and Malaysia's rising position within Asia, meant a greater receptivity to Mahathir's ideology. (19)

Mahathir's playing up of the West versus Islam antagonism was intended for his ideological project at home. He made an issue of the West's deep-seated hostility to Islam to mobilise Malaysian Muslims' anti-Western feelings, which had been lingering after the Gulf War in 1991. (20) Given the Malaysian Muslims' growing Islamic consciousness, and correspondingly greater interests in Islamic issues in the outside world, Mahathir stood as a force against the West, taking up the self-ordained guardianship of the Muslim world. It is worth noting that at one time even Nik Aziz Nik Mat, head of PAS, congratulated Mahathir by describing him as "an exemplary leader of the Muslim world." (21)

The dramatically transformed external environment had a number of significant ideological effects on the domestic front. First, the target of Malay nationalism was channeled from the non-Malays -- the Chinese in particular -- within the country to the West outside. Second, the shifting ideological constellation at the international level offered a domestic context in which the UMNO leadership's ideological and political outlook shifted from the Malay-centric Bumiputeraism to a more multi-ethnic and global approach. Mahathir's propagation of the national vision -- translated in the idiom of Islamic universalism and modernism -- combined to create a broader ideological framework in which the UMNO leadership's unprecedented "nationalistic" message was articulated. It was a more genuinely pluralistic national framework wherein both Muslims and non-Muslims could find their own place, at least at the ideological level. It was remarkable, indeed, that Mahathir's nationalist rhetoric, reinforced by many other material benefits, appealed to a wider spectrum of the Malaysian populace in the context of the dramatically altered political constellation in the international arena. (22)

The Expansion of the Muslim Urban Middle Class

To better understand the unprecedented public endorsement of the state's project of nation building, wider socio-cultural transformations should not be dismissed. The rapid industrialisation and modernisation primarily initiated by the developmental UMNO government -- especially the implementation of the NEP -- produced the ascendant Muslim urban middle class, heavily dependent upon the UMNO leadership. (23) The most significant consequence of this socio-economic development was a cultural change among the Muslims. The increasingly prevalent "middle-class" cultures symbolised by consumerist and materialistic lifestyles played a great role in altering an ethnic-based identity to a more global one. (24) Given higher educational and professional backgrounds, the Muslims also grew more confident in themselves, feeling that they could compete successfully with non-Malays. (25) It has to be noted, however, that despite these modernisation tendencies, urban middle-class Muslims became far more self-consciously Islamic during the last couple of decades. (26)

Equally noteworthy was the changing world view of the Malaysian populace, Muslim Malays and non-Muslims alike. The increasing exposure to the broader world -- a reflection of

expanded opportunities to visit and study as well as a dramatically advanced communication network -- influenced their perceptions in various ways. Mahathir's anti-imperialistic nationalistic platform resonated, albeit unevenly, with the general public's changing perceptions of their country, and helped place their historical experiences in a more global context.

The central point here is that Mahathir preempted his domestic audience: the growing ranks of a self-confident and increasingly influential urban middle class, which was more materialistically oriented and open to Western culture, but still wanted to pursue its religious faith. The Mahathir government's multi-ethnic and global orientation, as well as its enthusiastic call for material advancement and national development, was in response to this socio-cultural transformation. Moreover, this cultural reorientation, both in the sphere of state and of society at large, allowed Mahathir as well as modernist Muslims an increasing amount of space in which they could interpret Islamic texts in their own terms (an extremely radical act for Malaysia's conservative Islamic tradition). The increasingly materialism of the influential urban middle-class Muslims also contributed to the public's acceptance of the somehow "materialistic" and "pragmatic" Islamic interpretations by the UMNO's modernist leadership. It has to be emphasised that the UMNO's version of progressive Islam -- seen in contrast to the "traditionalist," "extremist" PAS -helped make the non-Muslims less suspicious of the enlarged position of Islam in the UMNO government's nation building enterprise. Thus, the government's approach of accommodation was a key ingredient in ensuring a larger public allegiance to the state's project of nation building.

Islamic Universalism and Modernism:

The Political Thinking of the UMNO's Modernist Leadership

The final yet most important factor in the Islamisation of Malaysian politics was the concept of "modernist Islam" that the UMNO leaders propagated in advancing their nationalist cause. They spent a great deal of political and economic resources - expanded enormously under Mahathir--to rationalise, advertise and implement this apparently contradicting combination of Islamic and nationalist causes.

In a way, the UMNO leaders' modernist Islamic concept arose out of the electoral competition between the ruling party and its archrival PAS, a major threat to the UMNO's dominance in the Muslim community. The UMNO government tended to become defensive when criticised by PAS on Islamic grounds because PAS had long aspired to establish an "Islamic state," whereas the UMNO had espoused a more "secular" outlook. Within the context of rising Islamic consciousness among the party's traditional support base in the Muslim community, the UMNO was alarmed that PAS's alternative national vision based on Islam -- and its single-minded commitment to the full implementation of Syariah (Islamic) law -- might divert Muslim support away from its ruling coalition BN. Despite the enormous pressure continually posed by the Islamic PAS, however, the UMNO leaders needed to balance the weight of the "Islamic threat" with other considerations. Their employment of the "modernist Islamic" vision has to be seen against this backdrop. Three factors require particular attention in this regard. First, their "modernist" interpretation of Islam offered a viable answer to the perplexing question pertaining to the relationship between Islam and nation building in a multi-religious/ethnic setting. This interpretation allowed them to resolve the question of how to accommodate the non-Muslim population without hindering their Islamisation cause. Second, their commitment to a liberal application of *ijtihad* (interpretation) to the Islamic texts by the UMNO leaders - especially by Mahathir and his former deputy Anwar -- was an extremely radical and courageous attempt in the context of the relatively conservative tradition of Malaysian Islam. Third and finally, the UMNO's commitment to "modern" and "liberal" Islam was meant to preempt the more "conservative" characters emphasised by the PAS's version of Islam from becoming too influential. From these perspectives, the UMNO leaders' political

ambition to build an economically and culturally developed and united Malaysia would not have been possible without a solid and attractive ideological foundation, on top of the political and socio-economic attributes discussed above.

The so-called Islamic concepts championed by the UMNO government throughout the 1990s revolved around two major themes. The first and central principle was the concept of "Islamic universalism." Together with "multiculturalism," this concept holds powerful implications in Malaysia's political situation both on the international and domestic fronts. On the international front, the notion of Islamic universalism ideologically rationalises the elevation of Islam to an equal footing with the West, and also implies the UMNO leaders' rejection of Western dominance and interference in their internal affairs. On the domestic front, multiculturalism rationalises and promotes the concept of an ethnically harmonious Malaysian nationhood. It allows various ethnic groups -- especially the economically influential Chinese -- a space in which to express their cultural identities. The Mahathir government attempted to implement this principle through its commitment to economic and cultural liberalisation throughout the 1990s. On the economic front, for instance, the government initiated the liberalisation and deregulation of the NEP. In contrast to the earlier NEP's pro-Malay bias, an increasing number of non-Malay businessmen were now awarded lucrative government contracts. (27)

The second principle championed was the concept of "Islamic modernism." Translated by the UMNO leaders in conspicuously materialistic terms, this concept symbolises their strong belief in economic development and material strength, which they rationalise as being the most crucial means of defending the religious faith and national integrity. Indeed, Mahathir at one stage suggested that "development is not for ourselves but for our religion and the country ... there is no point in upholding the integrity of the religion when we cannot defend it." (28) This statement was in response to PAS, which condemned the government's efforts at development as materialistic. (29) Further, given the full blessing of the UMNO leadership, IKIM launched various programs aimed at disseminating more progressive Islamic views among non-Muslims as well as Muslims.

What is evident from this practical perspective is that Mahathir's apparently "parochial" religious nationalistic cause was not so irrational as to affect the course of economic development. Rather, it was one that held economic development very firmly as a priority. For the ultimate goal of material advancement to be achieved, widespread ambivalence among the Muslims against material pursuit was considered to be nothing more than an obstacle. To transform such "backward" thinking among the Muslims, Mahathir added a new interpretation to Malaysia's rather conservative Islamic thinking: Islam not only permits material advancement, but also encourages it. (30) The UMNO leaders' conspicuously rational and materialistic Islamic tenets were, after all, based on their nationalist cause: to ensure Malaysia was developed in both the economic and cultural sense. To this end, building an integrated, forward-looking and globally-oriented nation embracing all ethnic groups was essential. (31)

Well aware of the centrality of Islam to the Muslim Malays' world view, UMNO leaders attempted to adopt extremely pragmatic -- and materialistic -- Islamic principles through their flexible and bold reinterpretations, and to thus transform the Muslim Malays' thinking into the "modern" mould they envisaged. The concept of "Islamic modernism" had an appeal that was laced with the Malay-centric bumiputeraism. Unlike the bumiputeraism rooted in a kampong (village)-based rural culture, the Islamic vision aspired to by the UMNO modernist leaders was "cosmopolitan," "progressive," "urban," and above all, "modern." The icon of Melayu baru (New Malay) popularised by these leaders was a symbol of this modern ideal. Even more significant was the UMNO government's ambition to incorporate non-Muslims into the mainstream of national development. Coupled with Mahathir's articulate vision of the national future, the government's enthusiastic call for interethnic conciliation throughout the 1990s greatly contributed to the unprecedented endorsement of his leadership among the non-Muslims, particularly among the Chinese. (32)

In general, the Chinese in Malaysia were not particularly interested in Islamic issues unless their interests were directly affected. Yet, the increasingly intense electoral competition between UMNO and PAS -- against the backdrop of the widespread trend of Islamic resurgence -- led to anxiety and suspicion among the Chinese. Their fear was that the UMNO government would take more drastic Islamisation measures to contain the influence of PAS. But, at the same time, they feared the extremist PAS was getting too close to power and felt that this, too, had to be stopped. The UMNO's vision of modernist Islam was, in fact, a quite attractive option for the non-Muslim minorities in Muslim-dominant Malaysia.

The twin quest of Islamisation-cum-modernisation engineered by the Mahathir government thus proposed a new compact between the state and a wider spectrum of the Malaysian populace. Its "authoritarian" mode of modernisation, indeed, intensified socio-economic as well as ideological cleavages and alienated the less privileged Muslim Malays. The sacking and subsequent ill-treatment of Anwar in September 1998 further aggravated the anti-government sentiment among both rural and urban Muslim Malays, and called into question the entire credibility of the UMNO government. The victory of the ruling coalition BN in the recent 1999 general elections, in fact, heavily depended on the Chinese vote; the UMNO was thus left even more vulnerable to pressures from the Chinese on the political and economic fronts. However, given the difficulty of reconciling the pressures exerted by the Islamisation forces with the task of nation building, Mahathir's personal contribution to nation building in postcolonial Malaysia should not be overlooked. It was the government's appropriation of the inclusive ideological approach -- rationalised by the idiom of Islamic modernism and universalism -- that helped mobilise broader nationalistic sentiments among the Malaysian populace, Muslim Malay and non-Muslim alike. This unprecedented surge of Malaysian nationalism - a conspicuously modern "hybrid" variant -- was primarily the product of the state's project of nation building.

Indonesia: Exclusion of Islam

The Merah-Putih versus Hijau Discourse

In Indonesia, on the other hand, the fate of Islam was disproportionately discredited in the main course of nation building. This alienation reinforced the peculiar political and ideological discourse which centred on the rivalry between the two "institutionalised traditions": the so-called Merah-putih (Nationalist) and Hijau (Islamic). (33) Such a cleavage would have been unthinkable in the Malaysian context. Although it is, indeed, somewhat simplistic and in some respects misleading, this recurrent Merah-Putih vis-à-vis Hijau paradigm provides for a useful starting point from which to analyse Indonesia's domestic political constellation under the New Order regime and thereafter. What is most striking about this political ideological division is the premise that the "Islamic" cause cannot be compatible with the nationalist cause, norm and vision. Underlying this assumption is an unfinished debate over the country's philosophical/ideological underpinning after independence; this debate centres on two opposing positions: those who want to have some type of formal link between Islamic ideology and the state, and those in favor of the Pancasila as the ideological foundation of the state. (34)

A half-century after the birth of pluralist Indonesia, the secular-nationalist tradition has become largely entrenched in the formal state structure, with Islam cast aside. Many Muslims with a modernist outlook thus continue to feel unease over the state-ordained national ideology, Pancasila, and the ideological position of Islam in the country. (35) This tense relationship -- which underlies our discussion of Islam and nation building under the republic's "secular-nationalist" leadership -- derived from Suharto's (and subsequent leaders') essentially "exclusivist" approach to Islam, despite the regime's dramatic rapprochement with important segments of the Muslim community since the late 1980s.

The Ideological Hegemony of the Nationalist Pancasila State

Under the Suharto-led New Order regime, which came to power after the abortive coup allegedly involving the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia or PKI), the Armed Forces (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia or ABRI), especially the army, assumed a dominant role within the state as well as in society at large. With President Suharto at the helm, both active and retired army officers occupied numerous key positions as cabinet ministers, local government officials, heads of state enterprises, and members of the parliamentary bodies. (36) It was this all-powerful political thinking of the army that dictated the fundamental direction of the New Order's nation building. At least until the late 1980s, the conventional wisdom among army officers was that "sectarian" Islam would pose a major threat to the inherently fragile national unity and to territorial integration. The army drummed up this "threat" of Islam as an ideological weapon to curtail the influence of the "extreme right" (Islamic force s), which had posed a major threat to its predominance after the physical termination of the "extreme left" (com- munists) in 1965-66. (37) Moreover, the army was proud to define its place in the country as the chief defender of the nation and of territorial integration. (38)

Its political predominance authorised the army -- alongside other secular-nationalist civilian leaders -- to promote the officially-sanctioned Pancasila as the sole ideology of the country. For the embryonic Indonesian nation, this ideology was to lay the guidelines for national development; in the spirit of the nationalist and pluralist Pancasila, concepts such as "development," "political stability," and "unity in diversity" were given particular emphasis as guiding principles. (39) This essentially highly integrationist national ideology, however, underpinned the New Order's ruthlessly exclusivist ideological theorisation. Its rationalisation of the Islamic "threat" was used by the New Order leaders at least until the late 1980s to victimise one of the New Order leaders' potential enemies: "political Islam." (40) While Malaysia found its enemy outside in the spectre of the West, Indonesia located its enemy within the national boundary, in the form of the Islamic threat.

The process of neutralising "political Islam" took place in the political, ideological, and socio-economic realms. In the political sphere, all four Muslim political parties (41) were fused into a single party, the United Development Party (Partai Perasatuan Pembangunan or PPP) in 1973. (42) Although the PPP from time to time became a rallying point for the Muslim community, this amalgamation had the effect of undermining the coherence of the individual component parties. (43) In turn, this helped discredit the "Islamic" voice in opposition to Golkar (Golongan Karya or functional groups), the government-sponsored party.

In the ideological sphere, all political parties and social and religious organisations were forced to adopt Pancasila as their sole ideological foundation (asas tunggal) in 1984. This was an attempt of the New Order regime to eliminate any chance for the pro-Islamic groups to promote an Islamic ideology in the country. (44) To popularise this national ideology, the government committed itself to a number of projects. For instance, the indoctrination courses for Pancasila moral teaching, known as P4 (Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila), were introduced to civil servants, teachers, lecturers, university students and other sections of society. (45) For Muslims, it has to be noted, this state-sponsored indoctrination campaign had an extremely devastating impact. First of all, it posed a very serious problem for Muslims because it touched on the sensitive areas of belief systems. (46) It also broke up Muslim leadership, as fierce disputes erupted over the proper response to the state's policy. In the electoral sphere, these plights within the Muslim community diminished even further the internal coherence of the Muslim organisations, particularly in the case of the PPP. (47)

In the socio-economic sphere, the way in which the Muslims were marginalised was equally striking. Under Suharto, non-Muslims -- Christians and Chinese in particular- played

extraordinarily influential roles in a variety of fields, both public and private. (48) In the public sectors, a limited circle of urban Westernised middle-class Christians enjoyed disproportionately predominant positions in the bureaucracy, military, educational institutions and numerous other state-linked agencies. What is important to note is that this bias was not only due to their better educational backgrounds but also to favours granted by the president. (49) In the private sector, dozens of ethnic-Chinese businesses connected to Suharto built vast diversified business empires and came to dominate various key industries ranging from manufacturing to banking through state bank loans, monopoly franchise concessions, and other special government privileges. (50) Other well-connected ethnic-Chinese conglomerates similarly thrived through partnerships with key military commands and sub-contracting deals with state projects. (51) Given such a high degree of concentration, it is of little surprise that Pribumi (indigenous) entrepreneurs -- alongside some prominent Muslim leaders -- claimed that the leading Chinese entrepreneurs enjoyed unfair government patronage at the expense of "indigenous" interests including Muslims. (52)

The "anti-Islamic" political alignment at home was reflected in the New Order regime's similarly "un-Islamic" stance at the international level. During most of the New Order regime, President Suharto -- unlike Mahathir -- expressed almost no interest in Islamic issues or in Arab-Islamic countries. Instead, it was "non-religious pragmatism" that shaped Indonesia's foreign policy. Overall, the government's emphasis on economic development imperatives made Indonesia's relations with Western countries the top priority in the global arena. Indonesia's position and role in the Muslim world, on the other hand, was marginal. (53) In this context, the New Order leadership saw the West as an important ally.

Islamisation of the New Order? The Rise of the Muslim Urban Middle Class

Despite all these "exclusivist" measures, however, the last couple of decades in Indonesia under Suharto witnessed the emergence of a more self-consciously Islamic, as well as a more self-confident, Muslim urban middle class. This process was somewhat equivalent to Malaysia's Islamic resurgence. Islamisation among the Indonesian Muslims was a consequence of the combination of state policies -- the repression of "political Islam" alongside the promotion of "socio-cultural Islam" -- as well as a fundamental sociocultural transformation. (54) Despite its restrictions on "political Islam," the New Order regime in fact did not hinder the socio-cultural activities of the Muslims. As Hefner emphasises, it provided massive infrastructural support, especially in the fields of education and social welfare, once the New Order leadership recognised that Islam was no longer associated with an overt form of political activism. (55) In the educational sphere, for instance, the government not only developed the state religious school system, but also subsidised tens of thousands of private Islamic schools. An already existing system of state Islamic teachers' training colleges, the IAIN, was expanded and granted additional state funding. (56) Likewise in the socio-economic sphere, a private foundation controlled by the president launched a massive program of subsidising mosque building throughout the country. (57)

Combined with rapid economic development under the developmental New Order, the expansion of Islamic education, both in public and private, swept rising numbers of devout modernist-outlook Muslims into influential positions not only in the private sector but also in the state sector, which had long been dominated by non-Muslims and abangan Muslims (nominal Muslims with syncretistic beliefs and practices). (58) Importantly, the essentially non-interventionist approach of the secular-nationalist state leadership on religious affairs left many of the religious functions to non-governmental actors, and kept state-sponsored Islamic institutions such as Islamic courts on the periphery of the state administrative structure. Although their political activities were largely restrained, the "religious" activities of non-governmental religious organisations -- not only those of the prestigious NU and Muhammadiyah but also of many others ranging from regional-based movements to "unorthodox" groupings -- flourished against the backdrop of rising Islamic consciousness

among the Muslims. Their relative administrative autonomy from the state meant that not much force was put into "homogenising" Islamic thinking and ruling. The diversity and syncretism in Islamic views and standpoints is indeed extraordinary, and a source of pride in the Indonesian Muslim community.

The Islamisation process also penetrated into the central power base of the New Order regime: Golkar and ABRI. (59) Although, in comparison to the situation a decade ago, their commitment to a pluralist-nationalist Pancasila state remained intact, more high-ranking officers in the army became less hostile to the greater presence of Islam in society. (60) Similarly, once both military and civilian New Order leaders recognised that the nation was experiencing an unprecedented Islam resurgence, Golkar even began advertising its commitment to Islam. (61)

This process of Islamisation both in state and society -- as well as the changing relationship between the president and the army's top brass within the regime -- brought about an extraordinary political realignment: the rapprochement of President Suharto with an important segment of the Muslim community. Without relaxing the strict restrictions on Muslim political activity, Suharto began taking some pro-Islamic initiatives in the late 1980s. (62) The most significant, and most controversial, development both for the pro-Islamic groups as well as the non-Muslim communities was the establishment of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Se-Indonesia, or ICMI) in 1990, and Suharto's strong blessing of it. (63) Headed by Suharto's long-time close associate and the then Minister for Research and Technology, B.J. Habibie, ICMI essentially served to forge an "alliance" between expanding networks of Muslim middle- and upper-class professionals and prominent Islamic figures (such as Amien Rais) and the New Order regime.

The abrupt demise of this highly glamourised Islamic association -- in tandem with the fall of the New Order leadership in May 1998 -- confirmed its feeble organisational and ideological foundation. (64) What is important about the controversies surrounding ICMI, however, at least in the context of the discussion here, is the extraordinary attention and expectations given to the association by the ascendant middle-class Muslims and its failure to meet those expectations. To understand the middle-class Muslims' aspiration for and eventual disappointment with ICMI, one has to look at the basically unchanged New Order regime's relations with Islam even after the ICMI's inception, especially in relation to the government's only partial success in meeting the rising aspirations of middle-class Muslims to participate in the mainstream of nation building.

De-Islamisation and the Failure of Indonesia's Nation Building

The New Order regime's essentially exclusivist approach to Islam in the ideological, political and socio-economic spheres -- in combination with more general socio-cultural trends -- alienated many Muslims from the avenues of upward social mobility and thereby from the upper echelons of state power. The foundation of ICMI, however, gave rise to hopes on the part of the middle-class Muslims of gaining favors from the government and access to the formal channels of influence. Indeed, from its inception, Habibie wielded considerable discretion over government personnel and contracts and thus built up an enormous clientele, mostly of urban, modernist, university-educated indigenous Muslims, within the state as well as in private business circles. He also created a patronage network of Islamic institutions, ranging from mosques and schools to publishing ventures, think-tank activities and dakwah (Islamic preaching) groups. (65)

Despite such impressive readjustments, the uneven distributive pattern typical of the New Order did not change much at a fundamental level. (66) Despite their higher educational and professional backgrounds, and now the patronage network based on ICMI, middle-class Muslims had yet to confront the unchanged New Order reality: the highly centralised and

unevenly distributed pattern of upward social mobility and capital accumulation. This pattern continued to favor an extremely limited elite: the alliance of the Suharto family, non-Muslim business and political clients. This had a far-reaching consequence on the course of Indonesia's nation building, one that stood in stark contrast to the Malaysian experience.

The most striking consequence was the increasing tension between the majority Muslim community and the non-Muslim -- in particular Chinese -- minorities. Faced with the government's unfavorable treatment, many in the Muslim community came to the conclusion that "the New Order Regime had been hijacked by an anti-Muslim alliance of Chinese Catholics, former PSI (Partai Sosialis Indonesia or Indonesian Socialist Party) socialists, and army officials." (67) Unlike the Malaysian Muslims, many Indonesian Muslims felt they had been deprived of their rightful place in the running of the nation. (68) The Chinese Indonesians, on the other hand, again unlike the Chinese Malaysians, have hardly ever been given proper treatment as national citizens even in their daily life -- let alone a rightful place in the running of the country. Their disproportionate economic affluence was simply viewed by many Muslims with envy and resentment. It was in this delicate climate that a segment of the pro-Islamic elite faction (such as B .J. Habibie and Adi Sasono) translated and manipulated such feelings of deprivation in "religious" terms to appeal to the self-consciously Islamic Muslim middle class. (69) This exacerbated even further the anti-Christian and anti-Chinese sentiments within the Muslim community.

Thus, the ethno-religious imbalance between the Muslims and the non-Muslims -- against the backdrop of Islamisation of the state as well as society at large -- acted as fertile ground for the tragic and violent conflicts centred on the religious/ethnic cleavage after the onset of the 1997 financial crisis. In contrast to the New Order regime's strong aspiration for pluralist and integrationist nation building, this real-world cleavage became too deep to be camouflaged by its national vision based on Pancasila. The essentially pluralist and integrationist ideology of Pancasila, indeed, exerted an extraordinarily centralising force. In the face of the threat of disintegration after the fall of Suharto, the new leadership -- both civilian and military -- has been rephrasing the "national" adherence to the Pancasila principle over and over again. It is generally acknowledged that if the nation is not to break up, "Indonesia" must stay committed to Pancasila: to the concept of one language, one nation, and one country, but many religions, and many races. (70)

The end of the authoritarian New Order regime brought about political liberalisation, with the formation of a number of new political parties. For Islamic leaders with a modernist outlook, the regime change meant that they could voice new visions of national order on their own terms, visions based on Islam. Some of them began officially upholding the banner of Islam and pledged the implementation of Syariah law. Others, including the more prestigious Muslim parties associated with NU and Muhammadiyah, however, chose to continue endorsing the "secular-nationalist" Pancasila as the national symbol, while setting Islam aside. The National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional or PAN), closely associated with Muhammadiyah and led by its former Chairman Amien Rais, went even further, asserting its multiethnic identity.

Moreover, the newly elected President Gus Dur assured the public -- both Muslims and non-Muslims alike -- that the republic should remain committed to the secular-nationalist principle, as mentioned at the onset. Therefore, the founding principle of secular-nationalism, which was later inherited by the staunch nationalist Megawati, keeps the Islamic aspirants who seek the formal implementation of the Islamic rules and symbols on the periphery of the nation-state structure. Thus, unlike Mahathir's inclusivist approach, the avowedly integrationist Pancasila, in fact, served to exclude Islamic forces from the formal channels of influence. To this end, the national ideology was extensively, and expensively, exploited by the secular-nationalist leadership.

Conclusion

This comparative analysis claims that the ideological dispositions of the respective states have had far-reaching real-world consequences on the course of nation building in the two Muslim-majority countries of Southeast Asia. The contrasting outcomes, however, depended on the way in which the state leaders appropriated particular ideologies. In this process, the position of Islam in the state's project of nation building -- whether it was appropriated inclusively or exclusively -- had an immense impact on the entire course of national development.

What is most conspicuous in this comparative analysis is the real-world effects of a "threat" perception commonly observed in the state leaders' ideological theorisation and manipulation. In both the Malaysian and Indonesian cases, there existed a clear image of threat. Importantly, the contrasting location and nature of the threat in the respective state's vision of nationhood had a decisive impact on the course of nation building. In Malaysia, the national enemy was sought and found outside the national boundary: in the West. The theme, centred on the threat of the West in opposition to Islam, was played upon by the Mahathir-led pro-Islamic UMNO leadership in order to mobilise nascent Malaysian nationalism. What is significant about this Malaysian experience is that the state's national vision helped incorporate both Muslims and non-Muslims despite its strong Islamic tone. It has to be understood that the Malaysian government spent a great deal of political and economic resources -- dramatically expanded under Mahathir -- on getting through its message of "modern," "progressive" Islam. Its persistent and careful propagation of "liberal," "modernist" Islam managed to not alienate the non-Muslim community. Combined with substantial material benefits, in fact, this Islamic message gained the Mahathir government unprecedented national endorsement, until the onset of the equally unprecedented and disastrous events involving the personal rivalry between Mahathir and his deputy Anwar. Despite this political fiasco, Mahathir continues to be acknowledged as a nation builder among the Malaysian public -- Muslims and non-Muslims alike -- and is likely to continue to be perceived as such in years to come. The non-Muslim support, more specifically, worked to sustain Mahathir's otherwise exhausted political resources. It is also noteworthy that the rising influence of the "extremist" PAS as an alternative Muslim force against the UMNO scared the non-Muslims away from the alliance of opposition parties, thereby securing more than a two-thirds majority in Parliament for the ruling coalition BN.

By stark contrast, in Indonesia the national enemy was sought within the national boundaries. Islam fell victim to this campaign under the New Order regime at least until the late 1980s. Despite some superficial readjustment from the 1990s on, Islam remained largely in an off-side position in the state's project of nation building. The Indonesian leaders' deep-rooted insensitivity to religious/ethnic questions -- and their exclusivist approach towards Islam in particular -- not only marginalised the Muslims from influential positions in various fields, but also helped instigate highly emotionally-charged religious hostility and violence between Muslims and non-Muslims.

Finally, this "threat" perception in the state's ideological composition is further illuminated when seen against the backdrop of the September 11th terrorist strikes. (71) In Malaysia, the modernist UMNO stirred up a "threat" of extremist Islam in order to portray its enemy PAS as a "threat" to national security, while distancing itself from "extremist" and "militant" Islamic forces both on the domestic and international fronts. The UMNO's anti-terrorist campaign at home thus helped damage the political as well as the Islamic credentials of the Islamic opposition. In Indonesia, on the other hand, secular-nationalist President Megawati was kept on the defensive by pressures from the Muslim-based partners within her own coalition. Unlike in the Malaysian case, the U.S. was increasingly seen as the common enemy, thus hampering Jakarta's and-terrorist efforts both at home and abroad.

Given the real-world effects of ideological power, this paper has attempted to theorise the

ideological dispositions of the two states' leaderships. The analytical value of this approach is similarly important, as it sheds light on the more fundamental and broader theoretical question of state-religion relations, an issue constantly salient in postcolonial Asian countries.

(1.) Robert W. Hefner and Patricia Horvatic, eds., *Islam in an Era of Nation-States: Politics and Religions Renewal in Muslim Southeast Asia* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1997), p.21.

(2.) *Straits Times*, November 7, 1999.

(3.) *Bumiputera* literally means a son of the soil and refers to an indigenous Malay.

(4.) For instance, *Far Eastern Economic Review* [FEER, hereafter], May 20, 1999, Pp. 45-47. This, of course, is not to suggest that sources of ethnic tension have diminished entirely. The most recent incident of ethnic fighting near the capital Kuala Lumpur, which has left six people dead, attests to this view. Nevertheless, Malaysia's racial tranquility remains a salient feature overall.

(5.) Pancasila consists of the following five principles which are included in the Preamble to the Indonesian Constitution of 1945: belief in God, a just and civilized humanitarianism, national unity, Indonesian democracy through consultation and consensus, and social justice.

(6.) Douglas E. Ramage, *Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance* (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), chap.1, especially pp.10-22.

(7.) For instance, *Forum Keadilan*, December 14, 1998 and December 28, 1998; *Gatra*, December 5, 1998 and December 12, 1998.

(8.) The paper's emphasis on the ideological aspect, however, does not imply neglect of other institutional aspects. Rather, the paper underscores the significance of ideological formation for two primary reasons. First, the rise and position of particular ideologies reflects a pattern of political constellation in a given context. Second, once institutionalised, ideology can exert a powerful force in legitimising and reinforcing relevant actors' political and socio-economic interests. Ideology thus brings with it significant political and socio-economic implications, thereby often -- but not always -- causing unintended outcomes.

(9.) The NEP was inaugurated in an attempt to increase Malay participation in the economic sector while eradicating poverty, particularly in the Malay community. For the NEP and related issues, see, for instance, Jomo Kwame Sundaram, *A Question of Class: Capital, the State, and Uneven Development in Malaya* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1986), chap. 10; R.S. Milne, "The Politics of Malaysia's New Economic Policy," *Pacific Affairs*, vol.49, no.2 (Summer 1976), pp.253-262.

(10.) The same ethnic considerations thwarted the emergence of strong anti-imperialistic nationalism, seen in other colonies in the region at the time of independence. See Ariffin Omar, *Bangsa Melayu: Malay Concepts of Democracy and Community, 1945-1950* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp.45-56.

(11.) For instance, Hussin Mutalib, *Islam in Malaysia: From Revivalism to Islamic State* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1993), pp.30-33.

(12.) Kikue Hamayotsu, "A Third Wave? Islamic Resurgence and the Emergence of Malaysian Nationalism," paper presented at the 10th Colloquium of the Malaysia Society, Australian National University, Canberra, November 22-23, 1997; Donald L. Horowitz, "The Qur'an and the Common Law: Islamic Law Reform and the Theory of Legal Change" (Part One & Two),

The American Journal of Comparative Law, vol.42, no.2 (Spring, 1994), pp.233-293; vol.42, no.3 (Summer, 1994), pp.543-580.

(13.) For instance, Star, May 2,1999.

(14.) For a general discussion on the Mahathir government's increasing authoritarianism, and the UMNO's factional dispute in the late 1980s in particular, see Harold Crouch, "Authoritarian Trends, the UMNO Split and the Limits to State Power," in Joel S. Kahn and Francis Loh Kok Wah, eds., *Fragmented Vision: Culture and Politics in Contemporary Malaysia* (Sydney: Asian Studies Association of Australia in Association with Allen & Unwin, 1992), pp.21-43.

(15.) Alasdair Bowie, "The Dynamics of Business-Government Relations in Industrialising Malaysia" in Andrew MacIntyre, ed., *Business and Government in Industrialising Asia* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1994), pp. 186-190; Edmund Terence Gomez and Jomo K.S., *Malaysia's Political Economy: Politics, Patronage and Profits* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p.181.

(16.) Khoo Boo Teik, *Paradoxes of Mahathirism: An Intellectual Biography of Mahathir Mohamad* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1995). See also Mahathir's writings and speeches.

(17.) Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

(18.) Mahathir bin Mohamad, *The Challenge* (Selangor Darul Ehsan: Pelanduk Publications, 1986), p.47.

(19.) For a brief overview on this topic in international relations, see Simon Murden, "Cultural Conflict in International Relations: The West and Islam," in John Baylis and Steve Smith, eds., *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp.374-389. For a further debate on related issues, see, for instance, Ghassan Salame, "Islam and the West," *Foreign Policy*, vol.90 (Spring 1993), pp.22-37. Mahathir's principal ideas and argument on the debate can be found in his writing. See Mahathir, *Challenge*, chap.4.

(20.) Hussin, *Islam in Malaysia*, pp.32-33.

(21.) *Sydney Morning Herald*, April 7, 1997.

(22.) At least until the onset of the Anwar affair in September 1998.

(23.) Gomez and Jomo, *Political Economy*, chap.3 and chap.5; Jomo, *Question of Class*, pp.243-282.

(24.) Abdul Rahman Haji Embong, "A critical Review of Studies of Malaysian Middle classes," working paper presented at the International Workshop on Social Transformation and the Rise of the Middle classes in South-East Asia, organised by the Program for South-East Asian Area Studies, Academia Sinica, Taipei. June 29-30, 1995. pp.20-21; Francis Loh Kok Wah, "Modernity, Mahathir's 'Vision 2020' and the Middle-class: Managing Ethnic Diversity in Malaysia in the 1990s," unpublished paper, 1997, p.34 Muhammad Ikmal Said, "Malay Nationalism and National Identity," *Suomen Antropolog*, no.2, p.25.

(25.) For instance, FEER, May 20, 1999.

(26.) For instance, Chandra Muzzafar, *Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia* (Petaling Jaya:

Penerbit Fajar Bakti, 1987); Robert W. Hefner, "Islamization and Democratization in Indonesia," in Robert W. Hefner and Patricia Horvatic, eds., *Islam in an Era of Nation-States: Politics and Religious Renewal in Muslim Southeast Asia* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1997), pp.75-128; Zainah Anwar, *Islamic Revivalism in Malaysia: Dakwah among the Students* (Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 1987).

(27.) The government's appreciation of non-Malay cultures was equally striking. The cultural liberalisation initiatives included: an emphasis on the English language; a lifting of restrictions on the lion dance; a nationwide double celebration of Hari Raya puasa (the celebration for the end of the fasting month) and the Chinese New Year in the mid-1990s; and an increase in Chinese, Indian and English programs on TV and radio. For these developments, see Edmund Terence Gomez, *The 1995 Malaysian General Elections: A Report and Commentary* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1996), p.35.

(28.) *New Straits Times*, April 11, 1994.

(29.) *Star*, December 21, 1994.

(30.) *Star*, January 22, 1993.

(31.) For instance, *Straits Times*, May 15, 1999.

(32.) Edmund Terence Gomez, *Chinese Business in Malaysia: Accumulation, Accommodation and Ascendance* (Surrey: Curzon, 1999), pp.135-137.

(33.) Merah-Pulih literally means red and white (the color of the national flag of Indonesia), and refers to the "Nationalist," while Hijan literally means green and refers to the "Islamic force."

(34.) For a more detailed discussion on this subject. see Zifirdaus Adnan, "Islamic Religion: Yes, Islamic (Political) Ideology: No! Islam and the State in Indonesia," in Arief Budiman, ed., *State and Civil Society in Indonesia* (Clayton: Center of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, Monash Papers on Southeast Asia, no. 22, 1990), pp.441-477; Deliar Noer, *Islam, Pancasila dan Asas Tunggal* (Jakarta: Yayasan Perkhidmatan, 1983). It has to be noted, far more than in the early post-independence period, this divide is now complicated by the presence of conservative Isismists and, more significantly, pious Muslims committed to a more-or-less secular nationalism. See Robert Hefner, "Islam and Nation in the Post-Suharto Era," in Adam Schwartz and Jonathan Paris, eds., *Politics of Post-Sharto Indonesia* (NewYork: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999), p.66.

(35.) See, for instance, a commentary on the Acehuese aspiration for building an Islamic state, *Straits Times*, November 14, 1999.

(36.) Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, revised ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), chaps.9-12.

(37.) Gatot Indroyono, ed., *Islam di Mata Para Jenderal* (Bandung: Penerbit Mizan, 1997); David Jenkins, *Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics 1975-1983* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesian Project, Cornell University, 1984), pp.I-12.

(38.) Adam Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1994), p.164.

(39.) Mochtar Pabottingi, "Indonesia: Historicizing the New Order's Legitimacy Dilemma," in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., *Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority*

(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), pp.224-236; Ramage, *Politics in Indonesia*, chap.1.

(40.) Intelligence operations masterminded by Suharto's major protege General Ali Mutopo (in the 1970s) and later by the Catholic intelligence and security chief Benny Murdani worked both to discredit certain modernist Muslim groups as "fanatics" and "terrorists" and to justify their harsh repression and political maneuvering. See Robert W. Hefner, "Islamization and Democratization in Indonesia," in Hefner and Horvatic, *Muslim Southeast Asia*, p.78; Jenkin, *Suharto and His Generals*, pp.21-32 [fn. 37]; William R. Liddle, "The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: A Political Explanation," *Journal of Asian Studies*, vol.55, no. 3 (August 1996), p.628; John Sidel, "Macet Total: Logics of Circulation and Accumulation in the Demise of Indonesia's New Order," *Indonesia*, no. 66 (October 1998), p.170.

(41.) Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Partai Muslimin Indonesia (PMI), Partai Syarikat Islam (PSI), and Perti.

(42.) Adnan, "Islamic Religion," p.454; Liddle, "Islamic Turn," p.628; Liem Soei Liong, "Indonesian Muslims and the State: Accommodation or Revolt?" *Third World Quarterly*, vol.10, no.2 (April 1988), pp.883-885.

(43.) The PPP, for instance, played a leading role in the opposition to the draft marriage law proposed by the government in 1973. This draft was an attempt to secularise marriage law and was seen by many Muslim leaders and organisations as a move to push back the role of Islam in everyday life. Due to their fierce opposition, the bill was eventually amended.

(44.) Adnan, "Islamic Religion," p.456; Hefner, "Islamization and Democratization," pp.88-89; Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, "Pancasila as the Sole Foundation," *Indonesia*, no. 38 (October 1984), pp. 74-83.

(45.) Adnan, "Islamic Religion," p.456; Saya Shiraishi, *Young Heroes: The Indonesian Family in Politics* (Ithaca: Southeast Asian Program, Cornell University, 1997).

(46.) Adnan, "Islamic Religion," p.456.

(47.) Hefner, "Islamization and Democratization," p.89.

(48.) Christians, about equally divided between Roman Catholics and Protestants, comprise about eight percent of the Indonesian population, but because of their historically greater opportunities for education, they continue to make up a large percentage of the modern elite.

(49.) Adnan, "Islamic Religion," pp. 447-448.

(50.) Jamie Mackie, "Towkays and tycoons: the Chinese in Indonesian economic life in the 1920s and 1980s," in *The Role of the Indonesian Chinese in Shaping Modern Indonesian Life* (special issue), *Indonesia* (1991), especially pp.90-96.

(51.) Crouch, *Army and Politics*, pp. 273-303.

(52.) Schwartz, *Nation in Waiting*, pp.122-123.

(53.) Rizal Sukma, *Islam and Foreign Policy in Indonesia: Internal Weaknesses and Dilemma of Dual Identity* (The Asian Foundation Working Paper Series no.11, 1999), pp.7-15.

(54.) Robert Hefner, "Islamizing Java? Religion and Politics in Rural East Java," *Journal of Asian Studies*, vol.46, no.3 (August 1987), pp.555-554; Hefner, "Islamization

Democratization"; Liddle, "Islamic Turn," pp.622-625; Schwartz, Nation in Waiting, pp.164-165 and pp.173-176; Sidel, "Macet Total," pp.170-171.

(55.) Hefner, "Islamization and Democratization," p.189.

(56.) Andree Feillard, "Traditionalist Islam and the State in Indonesia: The Road to Legitimacy and Renewal," in Hefner and Horvatic, Muslim Southeast Asia, pp.141-145.

(57.) Liddle, "Islamic Turn," p.621.

(58.) Sidel, "Macet Total," pp.170-171.

(59.) On Golkar, Adnan, "Islamic Religion," p.445; On ABRI, Schwartz, Nation in Waiting, p.175; Hefner, "Islam and Nation," p.66.

(60.) Hefner, "Islam and Nation," p.66.

(61.) Hefner, "Islamization and Democratization," p.89.

(62.) Until 1987, General Murdani, Suharto's most trusted agent, and himself a Roman Catholic surrounded himself with officers from abangan, Christian, and other religious minority backgrounds. After Murdani was fired as armed forces commander, santri-background officers were elevated to the top positions. This, however, should be understood as Suharto's political maneuvering to weed out officers considered loyal to Murdani rather than the Islamisation of the armed forces (Liddle, "Islamic Turn," pp. 629-630). The term Santri refers to a devout Muslim, distinguished from a non-devout, or syncretistic, Muslim in Indonesia. The abangan refers to the latter Muslims.

(63.) Nasurullah Ali-Fauzi, ed., ICMI: Antara Status Quo dan Demokratisasi (Bandung: Penerbit Mizan, 1995); Robert Hefner, "Islam State, and Civil Society: ICMI and the Struggle for the Indonesian Middle Class," Indonesia, no. 56 (October 1993), pp.1-37; Liddle, "Islamic Turn," p.625; Schwartz, Nation in Waiting, pp.173-185.

(64.) Liddle, "Islamic Turn," p.625.

(65.) These massive resources enabled ICMI and its leaders to attract leaders from a variety of Islamic organisations and to broaden its influence in the state and deepen its reach within society. See Sidel, "Macet Total," p.172.

(66.) Hefner, "Islam and Nation," pp.51-54.

(67.) Hefner, "Islamization and Democratization," p.78.

(68.) Schwartz, Nation in Waiting p.164.

(69.) For instance, FEER, December 3, 1998, pp.14-16; Gatra, January 23, 1999, pp.24-36.

(70.) Straits Times, October 31, 1999.

(71.) For an analysis of the strikingly different responses from Malaysia and Indonesia in the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks in the U.S., see Kikue Hamayotsu, "The 'Global' War Against a Threat of 'Islam'? A Southeast Asian Perspective," a paper presented at the 19th Annual Conference on Southeast Asia Studies, Local Knowledges and Global Forces in Southeast Asia, UC Berkeley February 8-9, 2002.

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